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INTRODUCTION
Health care cost increases have haunted United States policymaking since
the late 1960s. Medicare was implemented in 1966; as a result, the federal
government immediately began to pour millions of federal dollars into health
care expenditures, which have rapidly grown to ever-higher percentages of our
gross domestic product (“GDP”).3 U.S. health spending has grown nearly five
times as much as GDP since 1960.4 Yet for all this spending, we do not achieve
longer life or overall better health statistics than other industrialized countries
with modern health care systems.5
Our system is wasteful, inefficient, and often unscientific, as well as unfair
and inequitable for millions of Americans. We spend too much on services that
too often give us little or no benefits.6 Our high costs impose penalties on us at
an escalating rate—access to employer-based insurance coverage continues to
shrink,7 hospitals are forced to cut back on services, and government programs
are financially stressed at the state and federal levels.
3 See Marian E. Gornick et al., Thirty Years of Medicare: Impact on the Covered Popula-
tion, 18 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 179, 179, 216 (1996), available at http://199.173.
225.5/history/pdf/ThirtyYearsPopulation.pdf.
4
“[T]he United States spends considerably more on health care than would be expected
based on expenditures in other developed countries, even accounting for differences in
income.” Twenty-three percent of total U.S. health care spending—or $572 billion in
2009—exceeds “Estimated Spending According to Wealth.” JESSE W. BRADFORD ET AL.,
MCKINSEY CTR. FOR U.S. HEALTH SYS. REFORM, ACCOUNTING FOR THE COST OF U.S.
HEALTH CARE: PRE-REFORM TRENDS AND THE IMPACT OF THE RECESSION 2, 6, 8 (2011).
5 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD HEALTH DATA
2012: HOW DOES THE UNITED STATES COMPARE 1–2 (2012), www.oecd.org/unitedstates/
briefingnoteusa2012.pdf.
6 At least this is true for us as patients and payers. For the providers who get reimbursed for
this care, and the makers of drugs and devices, the benefit is obvious.
7 See Michael Cooper, Lost in Recession, Toll on Underemployed and Underpaid, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2012, at A11 (“The real entry-level hourly wage for men who recently
graduated from high school fell to $11.68 last year, from $15.64 in 1979, according to data
from the Economic Policy Institute. And the percentage of those jobs that offer health insur-
ance has plummeted to 22.8 percent, from 63.3 percent in 1979.”) (emphasis added).
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Health care costs have long risen at a higher rate than general inflation.8
The recession of 2008 has reduced this differential somewhat; health spending
and GDP grew at similar rates in 2010, with health spending as a share of GDP
steady at 17.9%.9 National health expenditures growth has ranged from as high
as 11.0% in 1990 to 3.9% in 2010.10 The shrinkage in the use and intensity of
health care goods and services in 2010 also reduced our share of personal
health care spending growth.11 Is it possible that structural changes in the
health care economy are slowing the rate of increase of inflation? Some ana-
lysts argue that this is so,12 and recent data confirms the slowing of health care
expenditures to the lowest rate since 1998.13
Slowing in health care spending may be due to several factors. First, hos-
pital inpatient utilization has declined between 2006 and 2010, falling 8.3% for
those over sixty-five and 3.0% for those over eighty-five.14 Since Medicare
covers the bulk of these costs, one would not expect individuals to have fore-
gone such treatment based on costs. Second, use-rate has dropped even in some
states that have experienced only modest increases in unemployment. This sug-
gests that forces other than recession-driven unemployment were causing the
8 In a classic article, Joseph Newhouse examines several explanations for “why medical
expenditure [constantly] increas[es], as opposed to [being] merely ‘high.’ ” Joseph P. New-
house, Medical Care Costs: How Much Welfare Loss?, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 5, 9–10 (1992).
Newhouse ultimately concludes that medical technology is a primary driver of high rates of
increase in expenditures. Id. at 11.
9 Anne B. Martin et al., Growth In US Health Spending Remained Slow In 2010; Health
Share Of Gross Domestic Product Was Unchanged From 2009, 31 HEALTH AFF. 208, 208
(2012).
10 See id. at 210 (Growth was 4.7% and 3.9% respectively in 2008 and 2010, in contrast
with growth of 7.6% in 2007 and double digits in the 1980s and 1990s.).
11 Sheila Smith, Joseph P. Newhouse & Mark S. Freeland, Income, Insurance, and Technol-
ogy: Why Does Health Spending Outpace Economic Growth?, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1276, 1283
(2009) (“Our model suggests that the unusual severity of the current recession will reduce
spending growth in the near term by an amount roughly comparable in magnitude to that of
the managed care era of the 1990s. Unfortunately, the model says nothing about how that
reduction may be brought about. . . . Income growth will continue to drive a rising health
share of GDP in decades to come, as spending on new medical technologies continues to
increase more rapidly than incomes. Ultimately, this effect must diminish as the opportunity
cost of additional growth in health spending rises—exacting a growing trade-off in the for-
gone consumption of all other goods and services.”).
12 See, e.g., Kenneth Kaufman, Bending the Health Care Cost Curve: More Than Meets the
Eye?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr. 13, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/04/13/bending-
the-health-care-cost-curve-more-than-meets-the-eye/.
13 The Altarum Institute recently concluded:
National health expenditures grew at an estimated annual rate of 4.3 percent in 2012, a bit
higher than the 3.9 percent experienced for each of the years 2009–2011. While this estimate is
subject to revisions, it portends a fourth consecutive year of record-low growth compared to all
previous years in the 50-plus years of official health spending data.
Health care prices in December 2012 rose by 1.7 percent compared to December 2011, the
lowest year-over-year growth since February 1998. The 12-month moving average at 2.0 percent
was the lowest reading since December 1998.
Ken Schwartz, Health Spending Growth Near 4 Percent for Fourth Year; Price Growth at
14-Year Low, ALTARUM.ORG (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.altarum.org/health-systems-
research-news-releases/7Feb13-health-spending-growth-4-percent-price-14year-low.
14 Kaufman, supra note 12.
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use-rate drops.15 The bad news is that such cost-curve abatement is unlikely to
continue when the recession begins to recede and spending picks up. Many of
the sources of inflation are still in place, particularly the size of the large cohort
of baby boomers entering retirement. We need to consider cost-control ideas
from every possible perspective.
The problem of cost in health care was not ignored by the Affordable Care
Act (“ACA”),16 contrary to the claims of its critics, who often have not read the
ACA,17 or who—like today’s congressional Republicans—have a political axe
to grind without regard to facts or good policy. The ACA, in fact, unites cost
and quality in many of its provisions.18 It promotes evidence-based medicine; it
aims to rationalize the delivery of health care and therefore improve patient
benefits for the same amount of money.19 Congress explicitly created in the
ACA a broad portfolio of cost-control instruments20: accountable care organi-
zations, comparative-effectiveness analysis, bundled payments, value-based
insurance design, limits on the exclusion of employer-financed premiums from
personal income tax, health insurance exchanges to promote competition
among insurance plans, pay for performance models using performance infor-
mation, and the Independent Payment Advisory Board, among others.21 Dem-
onstration projects are also an integral part of the ACA as part of a model of
experimentation with strategies that might make health care more efficient,
15 Id.
16 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
17 See, for example, Scalia’s comments at oral argument in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, indicating he had not read the ACA and had little intention of doing so. Transcript
of Oral Argument at 38, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Nos.
11-393, 11-398, 11-400).
18 Berwick and Hackbarth put it quite powerfully:
The ACA does not ignore waste reduction; indeed, many of its provisions aim for it. For
example, value-based purchasing can encourage hospitals and physicians to adopt best practices,
decrease patient injuries, and help reduce overuse of ineffective care. Accountable care organiza-
tions and bundled payment can give more patients the benefits of seamless care. Predictive ana-
lytics of Medicare claims and more aggressive enforcement ought to reduce fraud. Expansions of
bidding procedures may lead to prices that better reflect actual production costs. If successful,
these programs and others like them will reduce overall health care expenditures, provide a
windfall of “indirect” savings to CMS, and all the while improve patient care.
Donald M. Berwick & Andrew D. Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in US Health Care, 307
JAMA 1513, 1515 (2012).
19 See Barry R. Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety: The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1727, 1733, 1740 (2011) [hereinafter Furrow, Regulating
Patient Safety] (examining a wide range of regulatory initiatives in the PPACA and provid-
ing an overview of the PPACA’s patient-safety provisions).
20 Gawande objects: “Pick up the Senate health-care bill—yes, all 2,074 pages—and leaf
through it. Almost half of it is devoted to programs that would test various ways to curb
costs and increase quality. The bill is a hodgepodge. And it should be.” Atul Gawande,
Testing, Testing: The Complex Battle To Cut Health-Care Costs, NEW YORKER, Dec. 14,
2009, at 34, 38.
21 See JAMES R. HORNEY & PAUL N. VAN DE WATER, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORI-
TIES, HOUSE-PASSED AND SENATE HEALTH BILLS REDUCE DEFICIT, SLOW HEALTH CARE
COSTS, AND INCLUDE REALISTIC MEDICARE SAVINGS 2, 5–9 (2009), available at http://www.
cbpp.org/files/12-4-09health.pdf. These are their list of cost-saving ideas in the Senate and
House versions of the ACA, which I have summarized more briefly.
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more competitive, and of higher quality, and dozens of these projects are now
ongoing.22
The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) scored the final ACA legisla-
tion in 2010 (including the reconciliation bill) as reducing the deficit by around
$138 billion.23 The Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) most
recently estimated that the ACA will increase the rate of growth in national
health care costs by one-tenth of one percent annually from 2010 to 2020.24
Critics see the ACA as contributing to the federal deficit;25 even if this is
so, the ACA will expand coverage for millions of Americans now lacking it.
On the other hand, CBO projections typically underestimate savings from
reforms like those in the Affordable Care Act.26 The CBO is particularly cau-
tious about costing out innovative programs with no history of success. ACOs,
medical homes, outcomes-and-effectiveness research findings disseminated to
providers, and all the coordination reforms of the ACA are likely to be underes-
timated as to their cost-reducing successes. In fact, the ACA is off to a good
start—during the first year of implementation, the ACA increased health care
spending by less than one-tenth of one percent, less than anticipated.27
What I propose to do in this Article is to round up some of the “usual
suspects” for health care cost inflation on the assumption that the recession’s
impacts will eventually abate and more dollars will again pour into the health
care economy. I will then look at some of the provisions of the ACA and their
effect on the larger cost drivers in the U.S. system.
22 For a master list of CMS projects to date, see MASTER DEMONSTRATION, EVALUATION
AND RESEARCH STUDIES FOR ORDI SYSTEM OF RECORD 09-70-0591, http://www.cms.gov/
medicare/demonstration-projects/demoprojectsevalrpts/downloads/mastersorlist.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 5, 2013).
23 Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir. of the Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, at 2 (Mar. 18, 2010), available at  http://cbo.gov/
sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments /hr4872_0.pdf (“[E]nacting both pieces of legisla-
tion—H.R. 3590 and the reconciliation proposal—would produce a net reduction in federal
deficits of $138 billion over the 2010–2019 period as result of changes in direct spending
and revenue.”).
24 Sean P. Keehan et al., National Health Spending Projections Through 2020: Economic
Recovery and Reform Drive Faster Spending Growth, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1594, 1604 (2011).
25 For example, one critical analysis projects that it will add at least $340 billion to the
deficit over the next decade. CHARLES BLAHOUS, THE FISCAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 5 (2012), available at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publica-
tion/The-Fiscal-Consequences-of-the-Affordable-Care-Act_1.pdf.
26 Savings from the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997, which, like the ACA, changed
payment formulas under Medicare, were 50% greater than those forecast by the CBO for
1998 and 113% greater in 1999. Spending on the Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit
under the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 was about 40% below the CBO forecast. Jon
R. Gabel, Does the Congressional Budget Office Underestimate Savings from Reform?: A
Review of the Historical Record, 76 COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 2 (2010), available at http://
www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2010/1367_Gabel_
does_CBO_underestimate_savings_from_reform_ib.pdf (citing Jon R. Gabel, Congress’s
Health Care Numbers Don’t Add Up, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2009, at A23).
27 See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., Introduction to HEALTH CARE REFORM: SUPPLEMENTARY
MATERIALS (2012).
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I. SPEND UNTIL IT HURTS: THE USUAL SUSPECTS
The history of U.S. health care reform displays a constant tension between
expansion of health care coverage and a struggle to contain the escalation of
costs of such coverage.28 We have passed through three stages of health care
reform in the last hundred years or so: Progressive Health Insurance, Expan-
sionary Health Insurance, and Containment Health Insurance.29 These stages
illustrate the natural evolution of the American system as medicine gained
power to treat and cure, requiring an increasingly expensive infrastructure of
support.
The period of Progressive Health Insurance, from the 1890s to the 1920s,
gets its name from Progressive political reformers, who saw health insurance as
a way to stabilize incomes for workers. Progressive reformers’ central focus
was twofold: legislating workers’ compensation statutes to protect workers in
the workplace and improving public health regulation of water supplies and
food.30 They were mostly concerned about the negative features of industrial
capitalism and high-density overcrowded cities, so insurance was focused on
employment and its side effects during that period.
The Expansionary Health Insurance period, from the 1930s through the
1960s, was driven by the need to improve access to health care services.31 As
medicine developed tools to treat illness and the hospital became central to the
delivery of these services, health care costs, particularly hospital costs, began to
increase. Health insurance was the best way to cover hospital care, by
expanding coverage for lower- and middle-income groups.32 Blue Cross plans
were developed during this era, and commercial insurance soon followed, com-
peting with the Blues.33 Health insurance tied to employment was a byproduct
of wartime collective bargaining, when wage increases were not negotiable.34
Locating health insurance in employment foreshadowed future health care cov-
erage problems because health insurance as a fringe benefit of work meant that
28 Much of this historical discussion is derived from my article, Barry R. Furrow, Health
Reform and Ted Kennedy: The Art of Politics . . . and Persistence, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 445, 446 (2011) [hereinafter Furrow, Health Reform].
29 These periods of reform are developed in Paul Starr, Transformation in Defeat: The
Changing Objectives of National Health Insurance, 1915–1980, 72 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 78,
78 (1982) [hereinafter Starr, Transformation in Defeat]; see also PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE ix (1982) [hereinafter STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION] .
30 Furrow, Health Reform, supra note 28, at 449. See also DONALD W. ROGERS, MAKING
CAPITALISM SAFE: WORK SAFETY AND HEALTH REGULATION IN AMERICA, 1880–1940, at 4,
66 (2009) (describing Progressive contributions to the development of workers’ compensa-
tion laws in Wisconsin and elsewhere); see generally MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCON-
TENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870–1920, at xiv
(2003).
31 See Starr, Transformation in Defeat, supra note 29, at 81–82; see also Furrow, Health
Reform, supra note 28, at 449.
32 Furrow, Health Reform, supra note 28, at 449.
33 Id. For a more elaborate discussion of the struggles for health care from 1929 to 1945,
including the emergence of the Blue Cross plans, see STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION,
supra note 29, at 295–98.
34 Furrow, Health Reform, supra note 28, at 449.
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loss of employment meant losing coverage.35 Unlike most national health sys-
tems, health care access was not portable and could be lost if a job was lost. As
costs have risen, access to health insurance has dropped in the employment
setting.
The Containment Health Insurance era began in the 1970s in response to
rapid increases in health care spending driven by the recently enacted Medicare
program (and Medicaid soon after).36 Two groups of Americans with expen-
sive health care needs, the elderly and the poor, were suddenly able to get
health care services paid for by the federal government.37 Medicare began to
pour federal dollars into the health care marketplace as ten percent of the
American population became Medicare- and Medicaid-eligible in the mid-
1960s.38 And this flow of federal dollars was largely unregulated from 1966 to
1983 when the prospective payment system was instituted to control Medicare
hospital costs.39 Health expenditures jumped from $42 billion in 1965 to $420
billion in 1985, a ten-fold increase.40 Federal officials panicked in the face of
such dramatic spending increases and the fear of ever-increasing health care
cost inflation. Health reform efforts in the mid-1970s were pursued by the
Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations.41 Health care cost inflation in this era
was fueled by a range of economic drivers created by earlier federal policy
decisions: biomedical research was now funded at a high level, the physician
supply rapidly expanded, and hospitals were receiving federal subsidies for
construction under the Hill Burton Act.42 Hospitals expanded and their costs of
care grew, predictably increasing consumer demand for health insurance.43
New medical technologies were also coming online with new surgical and
diagnostic tools promising to cure disease and improve people’s lives.44
35 Id.
36 Id. at 449–50; Starr, Transformation in Defeat, supra note 29, at 84–85.
37 Furrow, Health Reform, supra note 28, at 450.
38 See THEODORE H. TULCHINSKY & ELENA A. VARAVIKOVA, THE NEW PUBLIC HEALTH
471 (2d ed. 2009).
39 Furrow, Health Reform, supra note 28, at 450. The diagnosis-related groups (DRG) pro-
spective payment system was mandated by Congress in 1982 to control Medicare costs. This
system changes payment from a highly inflationary fee-for-service approach to a per-case
reimbursement mechanism, which divides inpatient admission cases into categories called
diagnosis-related groups. Medicare then pays hospitals a flat rate per case based on the par-
ticular DRG. The goal is to reward efficient hospitals and create incentives for inefficient
hospitals to improve. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., MEDICARE HOSPITAL PROSPECTIVE
PAYMENT SYSTEM: HOW DRG RATES ARE CALCULATED AND UPDATED 1 (2001), available
at https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-00-00200.pdf.
40 Furrow, Health Reform, supra note 28, at 450.
41 Id. The history of health reform from the perspective of American presidents is well
summarized in American Presidents and Health Reform: A Chronolgy [sic], HOSPITALS &
HEALTH NETWORKS (Feb. 2009), http://www.hhnmag.com/hhnmag/jsp/articledisplay.jsp?
dcrpath=HHNMAG/Article/data/02FEB2009/0902HHN_CoverStory_WebExtra&domain=
HHNMAG.
42 See Furrow, Health Reform, supra note 28, at 450; see also Hill-Burton Act, FREE DIC-
TIONARY.COM, http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Hill-Burton+Act (last visited
Apr. 5, 2013).
43 Furrow, Health Reform, supra note 28, at 450. See also STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFOR-
MATION, supra note 29, at 381–82.
44 See STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 29, at 386–87.
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The regulatory tensions between cost control and access increased during
this period. Fault lines in the Medicare and Medicaid programs became visible,
with rapid cost inflation and uneven access for poor and rural residents becom-
ing obvious.45 The modes of reimbursement—fee-for-service payment to phy-
sicians and “usual, customary, and reasonable” charges—created a national
crisis by 1970.46 As costs skyrocketed, federal health care regulation of cost
increases began in earnest. Several major pieces of legislation were enacted:
price stabilization programs in 1972, the Health Maintenance Organization Act
in 1973,47 and the Health Planning and Resource Development Act and its
Certificate of Need requirements in 1974.48 Private employers began to cost-
shift escalating insurance costs to their employees; their strategies included nar-
rowing employee choice of plans, adding deductibles to coverage, and dropping
employee dependents from plan coverage.49 From these growing burdens on
employment-based insurance, one could predict that problems of access to
health care would only increase in the next three decades.50
Prior to 1989, physicians were compensated by both private insurers and
Medicare by the usual, customary, or reasonable (“UCR”) method, with pay-
ment determined based on the lowest of: the bill submitted, the customary
charge of the physician, or the prevailing rate in the area for those services.
This mode of payment was inflationary, since physicians had a strong incentive
to increase their fees over time to raise the reasonable rate calculation in the
future.51
Smaller companies started to drop health insurance or shift employees
from full-time to part-time to reduce their costs starting in the late 1990s and
early 2000s. During this period, health care providers began to manifest hyper-
entrepreneurship: the hospital industry witnessed a burst of non-profit acquisi-
tions by for-profit hospitals, and managed care plans began expanding
rapidly.52
The hospital as the “hub of health care” began to fade in the 1990s. The
federal DRG program’s fixed prices for hospital procedures had the predictable
effect of incentivizing administrators to move procedures out of the hospital
and into unregulated settings where prices were not controlled by the DRG
45 Furrow, Health Reform, supra note 28, at 450. See also STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFOR-
MATION, supra note 29, at 382.
46 Furrow, Health Reform, supra note 28, at 451 (quoting REXFORD E. SANTERRE & STE-
PHEN P. NEUN, HEALTH ECONOMICS: THEORY, INSIGHTS, AND INDUSTRY STUDIES 300 (5th
ed. 2010)).
47 Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300e (2012)).
48 Furrow, Health Reform, supra note 28, at 451.
49 Id. (citing GERALD R. LEDLOW & M. NICHOLAS COPPOLA, LEADERSHIP FOR HEALTH PRO-
FESSIONALS: THEORY, SKILLS, AND APPLICATIONS 292 (2011)).
50 Id. (citing Barry R. Furrow, Access to Health Care and Political Ideology: Wouldn’t You
Really Rather Have a Pony?, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 405, 407 (2007) [hereinafter Furrow,
Access to Health Care]).
51 SANTERRE & NEUN, supra note 46, at 300.
52 Furrow, Health Reform, supra note 28, at 451 (citing Furrow, Access to Health Care,
supra note 50, at 409 and ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND
LIMITS OF MARKETS 134 (1996) (The description of a “hyper-entrepreneurial environment”
is used by Robert Kuttner to describe the frenzy of market forces during these last decades)).
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system.53 More medical encounters were displaced to non-hospital settings, and
surgical procedures were shifted to outpatient surgery settings. Patient care
began a major shift out of hospital care into ambulatory care centers, home
health agencies, hospices, and physician group practices.54 Hospital care was a
casualty; hundreds of hospitals closed starting in the early 1980s. This trend is
continuing under the pressure of the Affordable Care Act; hospitals merge or
transform themselves into other forms such as long-term care facilities.55
This expansion of outpatient care in pursuit of higher profits in a largely
unregulated setting can produce profit margins sometimes exceeding twenty-
five percent.56 Such outpatient procedures have advantages: they often result in
quicker patient recovery and can be performed less expensively than in the
hospital. The problem is that the combination of lucrative fee-for-service reim-
bursement and customer convenience leads to high use of the outpatient ser-
vices—convenience at a largely unregulated high price.
This historical overview reveals another source of high costs unique to the
U.S. health care system—a fragmented, uncoordinated system. A progressive
fragmentation of care has occurred as the result of the multiplicity of reim-
bursement sources for health care: Medicare is for the elderly; private employ-
ment-based insurance is available to working adults; Medicaid is for the poor;57
hospital emergency rooms reluctantly care for undocumented immigrants under
the mandate of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(“EMTALA”);58 and the Veteran’s Administration system treats the large pop-
ulation of veterans in need of treatment.59 This complex system managed to
cover health care costs for most working Americans for decades, as well as for
the old and some fraction of the poor. But as costs have risen, the system has
begun to stumble.
A fragmented reimbursement structure means two things. First, adminis-
trative costs are high compared to single-payer or highly regulated systems like
the French or German health care systems. Hundreds of private insurers market
their wares to thousands of employers and individuals, while a variety of fed-
eral and state programs exist in tandem for their eligible insureds. Second, the
lack of a single strong payer or coordinated payers means that no single power-
ful agency confronts providers in the private insurance market in their demands
for rising incomes and revenues.
The ACA has the potential to create a new era of health care reform—
Quasi-Social Insurance. President Obama signed the ACA into law on March
53 Id. at 451.
54 See id. at 451–52 (citing HARRY A. SULTZ & KRISTINA M. YOUNG, HEALTH CARE USA:
UNDERSTANDING ITS ORGANIZATION AND DELIVERY 114 (2011)).
55 Id. at 452. The Census Bureau reported 6,649 hospitals in 1990 and 5,708 hospitals in
2007. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 115
(2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/10statab/health.pdf.
56 STEVE JACOB, HEALTH CARE IN 2020: WHERE UNCERTAIN REFORM, BAD HABITS, TOO
FEW DOCTORS AND SKYROCKETING COSTS ARE TAKING US 204 (2012).
57 Furrow, Health Reform, supra note 28, at 452.
58 See Joseph Zibulewsky, The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA): What It Is and What It Means for Physicians, 14 PROCEEDINGS—BAYLOR U.
MED. CENTER 339, 339 (2001).
59 Furrow, Health Reform, supra note 28, at 453.
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23, 2010. One week later, the president signed the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act,60 which amended some of the spending and revenue provi-
sions of the ACA. Together, these statutes represent the most significant
change in the American health care system in a generation. The ACA promotes
access to health care through a change in the core definition of private insur-
ance and the decoupling of poverty and Medicaid, while also shifting some
responsibility to individuals to improve their own health. The ACA moves us
closer to an ideal of universal coverage of all citizens as a right.
The ACA strengthens the pressure on employers to provide insurance for
their employees, under threat of penalties, and the insurance exchanges set up
under the act require that insurance offerings be transparent in their design and
easily available and that the price of such policies bear some relation to the
insured’s ability to pay.61 The ACA, in Tom Baker’s words, “continues a long
term trend in U.S. health care financing away from the ordinary market[-based]
approach, [according to] which people pay for their own health care services at
the point of consumption.”62 Baker notes that the ACA also asks people to “pay
their fair share of the overall cost of health care, primarily through taxes and
insurance premiums and [also] through cost-sharing at the point of consump-
tion.”63 The ACA expands the private insurance market through a wide range
of strategies: mandates and subsidies to promote private insurance market cov-
erage; the expansion of Medicaid in those states that choose to do so; reduc-
tions in Medicare cost sharing; and a range of insurance restrictions, including
limits on permitted cost sharing.64 The ACA also requires insurance availabil-
ity in the small-group and individual markets.65
The insurance reforms in the Affordable Care Act change health insurance
from a model based on individual actuarial assessment of health risks to what
Tom Baker calls a new concept of “fair share” in health care. Under the new
model, insurance discrimination is largely eliminated in favor of determining
an individual’s share of health care costs according to an individual’s ability to
pay rather than on the volume of services consumed, and more on individual
60 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20, 26, and 42 U.S.C.).
61 See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119, §§ 1301–02 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The term “essen-
tial health benefits package” is defined as coverage that “limits cost-sharing for such cover-
age . . . .” Id. § 1302(a)(2). Section 1302(b) defines the essential health benefits that must be
provided. Id. § 1302(b). A separate section prohibits discrimination based on salary in the
provision of insurance. Id. § 2716.
62 Tom Baker, William Maul Measey Professor of Law and Health Sciences, University of
Pennsylvania Law School, 2010 Hawley Lecture: Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility
after the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, at 11 (Aug. 26, 2010), available at
http://www.uiowa.edu/~ibl/documents/Health_Insurance_Risk_and_Responsibility_after.
pptx.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 The ACA accomplishes this in Title 1 in several critical ways by mandating fair premi-
ums, guaranteed availability and renewability of insurance coverage, prohibition of preexist-
ing condition exclusions, prohibition of health status discrimination, comprehensive
coverage, and limits on waiting periods. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
§§ 2701–05, 2707–08.
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choices than on genetic or preexisting health risks.66 The ACA also fosters
wellness and prevention programs by eliminating cost-sharing for preventive
health services.67 The wellness program in Title 1 of the ACA prohibits the use
of health status to discriminate and decrees that wellness programs cannot be
designed to use health-status factors.68
The Affordable Care Act tries to improve access to care for millions of
Americans while reducing fragmentation and its resulting inefficiencies.69 Con-
gress intended to produce a better-integrated, more effective, more technologi-
cally innovative system.70 The ACA develops several strategies to reduce the
fragmentation of care that underpins many of today’s cost problems.71 Many
ideas are new, although other ideas reinforce government policies that are in
the process of being implemented on a trial basis. From a broad cost perspec-
tive, the ACA aims to reduce system costs per capita while providing efficient
care for those who otherwise would be relegated to hospital emergency rooms
or no care at all.
Let us dig a bit deeper into the range of possible explanations for our
health care cost increases and see where the ACA helps and where it falls short.
A. Scientific Advances: Technology as a Cost Driver
The usual suspects cited by economists for rising health care costs are:
aging of the population (2%); changes in third-party payment (10–13%); per-
sonal income growth (5–23%); prices in the health care sector (11–22%);
administrative costs (3–13%); defensive medicine and supplier-induced
demand (0%); and technology-related changes in medical practice (38–65%).72
66 Baker, supra note 62, at 11.
67 Section 2716 of the ACA prohibits discrimination based on salary, and section
2717(a)(1)(D) requires insurers to implement wellness and health promotion activities.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 2716–17.
68 Id. § 2705(a)(1).
69 See Furrow, Access to Health Care, supra note 50, at 410. I have recounted elsewhere
some of the factors that have led to and reinforced our fragmented system. Id. at 407–08
(describing shrinking of employment-based insurance coverage).
70 See supra note 18 for a list of the sheer variety of cost conserving ideas in play in the
ACA.
71 See Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Health Care Fragmentation, in THE
FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 1, 11–12 (Einer Elhauge
ed., 2010) (citing, among other causes of such fragmentation, the law and legal doctrines that
thwart efficiencies and the payment system of Medicare).
72 PAUL B. GINSBURG, HIGH AND RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS: DEMYSTIFYING U.S.
HEALTH CARE SPENDING 11 (2008), available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/
reports/issue_briefs/2008/rwjf32704/subassets/rwjf32704_1. For a more recent analysis, see
Sheila Smith, Joseph P. Newhouse & Mark S. Freeland, Income, Insurance, and Technology:
Why Does Health Spending Outpace Economic Growth?, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1276, 1276
(2009) (“[Technology] is the primary driver of health spending growth . . . [which] is fueled
by rising incomes and more generous insurance coverage. We estimate that medical technol-
ogy explains 27–48 percent of health spending growth since 1960—a smaller percentage
than earlier estimates. Income (gross domestic product, or GDP) growth plays a critical role,
primarily through the actions of governments and employers on behalf of pools of consum-
ers. The contribution of insurance is likely to differ, with less of a push from increasing
generosity of coverage and more of a push from changes in provider payment.”).
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Technology is usually the number-one suspect as a cost driver. We love
technology in the United States. We are early adopters, and we value many
forms of technological innovation for their own sake. Medical technology is a
major engine of health care cost increases.73 It can account for an estimated
one-half to two-thirds of spending growth.74 Health care economists estimate
that 40–50% of annual cost increases can be traced to new technologies or the
intensified use of old ones.75
Medical technology takes many forms: it can be new surgical procedures,
new drugs or medical devices, or infrastructure support tools such as electronic
health records (EHRs).76 The bursts in technology adoption are often quite
striking. For example, in the period from 1996 to 2007, Jacob notes that “[u]se
of advanced imaging technology in outpatient facilities tripled . . . . Knee and
hip replacements increased 60 to 70 percent.”77 Angioplasty surgeries to open
blocked or narrowed coronary arteries went from low use of stents to more than
ninety percent using stents by 2006, most coated with drugs.78 U.S. procedures
to treat blocked coronary arteries are double the OECD average; knee replace-
ments are fifty percent above, cesarean sections are nearly twenty-five percent
above.79 All of these procedures are expensive and are largely responsible for a
doubling in Medicare Part B reimbursement, which covers doctor and outpa-
tient services, to $14.1 billion, from 2000 to 2006.80
Technologies like those described may be of higher quality, or they may
have lower costs per unit,81 but they are likely to be delivered inefficiently
73 David A. Squires, Explaining High Health Care Spending in the United States: An Inter-
national Comparison of Supply, Utilization, Prices, and Quality, 10 COMMONWEALTH FUND,
May 2012, at 10, available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Issue-Briefs/
2012/May/High-Health-Care-Spending.aspx (“U.S. health care spending, which reached
nearly $8,000 per person annually in 2009, has outpaced GDP growth for the past several
decades and far exceeds spending in any other country. The analysis in this brief suggests
that this spending cannot be attributed to higher income, an aging population, or greater
supply or utilization of hospitals and doctors. Instead, it is more likely that higher spending
is largely due to higher prices and perhaps because of more readily accessible technology
and greater rates of obesity. Despite being more expensive, the quality of health care in the
U.S. does not appear to be notably superior to other industrialized countries.”).
74 GINSBURG, supra note 72, at 11.
75 See Callahan, supra note 2, at 79. Ginsburg writes: “The dominant driver of long-term
cost trends is advancing medical technology, where new options for diagnosis and treatment
often replace older technologies that are less expensive or provide opportunities when none
existed before. Advancing technology may have a particularly large impact on spending in
the United States because of few requirements that effectiveness be demonstrated before
technologies are used broadly and concern that their application tends to go beyond those
patients likely to benefit the most from them. GINSBURG, supra note 72, at 19.
76 JACOB, supra note 56, at 204.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2011: OECD
INDICATORS 90–93, 96–97 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/health/healthpoliciesanddata/491058
58.pdf.
80 JACOB, supra note 56, at 204. See also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2009: WITH SPECIAL
FEATURE ON MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 68–78 (2010).
81 GINSBURG, supra note 72, at 15. See also Glen Whitman & Raymond Raad, Bending the
Productivity Curve: Why America Leads the World in Medical Innovation, POL’Y ANALYSIS,
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through use of high inputs and often to patients who get only small or no bene-
fits from the treatments.82 We effectively subsidize innovation in medicine for
the whole world at the price of our own high inflation rate.83
Control of the diffusion of technology is central to controlling health care
costs. New technologies are not always innovations, and one of the hardest
tasks is to sort the promising from the false innovation.84 Innovations in new
drug, medical device, and surgical technologies pose complicated assessment
problems for health care. Although these new technologies raise costs by
adding new diagnostic tools and surgical or other approaches to care whose
benefits are rarely fully developed, innovative use of technologies of organiza-
tion and data collection can reduce costs and improve quality. One study, for
example, found that the vintage (or newness) of drugs used improved longevity
in Germany and France. In France, chemotherapy innovation may have
accounted for up to one-sixth or more of the decline in French cancer mortality
rates during 2002–2006.85 Another Australian study found hospital therapeutic
innovations to be cost-effective, showing little impact on the cost of medical
procedures.86 Another study by the same author looked at cancer imaging and
cancer drug improvements and concluded that:
Nov. 18, 2009, at 1–4 (noting that the U.S has contributed the most innovations to medical
advances. Areas include basic medical science, diagnostics, therapeutics, and business mod-
els such as retail clinics. The authors also note, “In general, Americans tend to receive more
new treatments and pay more for them—a fact that is usually regarded as a fault of the
American system. That interpretation, if not entirely wrong, is at least incomplete. Rapid
adoption and extensive use of new treatments and technologies create an incentive to
develop those techniques in the first place. When the United States subsidizes medical inno-
vation, the whole world benefits. That is a virtue of the American system that is not reflected
in comparative life expectancy and mortality statistics.”).
82 GINSBURG, supra note 72, at 15–16.
83 See Whitman & Raad, supra note 81, at 9.
84 Emanuel uses the phrase “pseudo-innovation” to describe new technologies that offer
little or no gains over existing medical tools. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, In Medicine, Falling for
Fake Innovation, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (May 27, 2012, 7:49 PM), http://opinionator.
blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/27/in-medicine-falling-for-fake-innovation/.
85 Frank R. Lichtenberg, Contribution of Pharmaceutical Innovation to Longevity Growth in
Germany and France, 2001–[2007], 30 PHARMACOECONOMICS 197, 210 (2012). In his
study, Lichtenberg looked at “information on about 250 million prescriptions per year for
over 600 active ingredients . . . .” Id. at 201. Lichtenberg found that German states “with
larger increases in drug vintage had larger increases in life expectancy . . . . German life
expectancy at birth increased by 1.4 years during the period 2001–[2007]. The estimates
imply that about one-third of this increase was due to the replacement of older drugs by
newer drugs. The estimate of the cost per life-year gained from the use of newer drugs is a
small fraction of leading economists’ estimates of the value of (willingness to pay for) an
additional year of life.” Id. at 210. In France, he looked at the “utilization of 11 cancer drugs
by about 4000 cancer patients per year.” Id. He concluded that “[a] 10-year increase in mean
drug vintage was estimated to reduce the age-adjusted mortality rate by about 6%. . . . The
estimates implied that chemotherapy innovation accounted for at least one-sixth of the
decline in French cancer mortality rates during 2002–[2006], and may have accounted for as
much as half of the decline.” Id.
86 Frank R. Lichtenberg, The Impact of Therapeutic Procedure Innovation on Hospital
Patient Longevity: Evidence from Western Australia, 2000–2007, 77 SOC. SCI. & MED. 50,
50, 57–58 (2013).
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[A]bout 9% of the decline in the mortality rate from all causes of death is attributable
to cancer imaging innovation, and about 6% is attributable to cancer drug innovation.
Life expectancy at birth may have been increased by just under three months between
1996 and 2006 by the combined effects of cancer imaging and cancer drug
innovation.87
A third study looked at longevity in U.S. states. Three variables were con-
sidered: the average quality of diagnostic imaging procedures, defined as the
fraction of procedures that are advanced procedures; the average quality of
practicing physicians, defined as the fraction of physicians that were trained at
top-ranked medical schools; and the mean vintage (FDA approval year) of out-
patient and inpatient prescription drugs.88 The author concluded:
Life expectancy increased more rapidly in states where (1) the fraction of Medicare
diagnostic imaging procedures that were advanced procedures increased more rap-
idly; (2) the vintage of self- and provider-administered drugs increased more rapidly;
and (3) the quality of medical schools previously attended by physicians increased
more rapidly. States with larger increases in the quality of diagnostic procedures,
drugs, and physicians did not have larger increases in per capita medical
expenditure.89
If we apply Emanuel’s test—demanding of the innovation solid evidence
that “it prolongs survival, reduces side effects or improves quality of life—or
maintains the current standard of care at a lower cost”—many new technolo-
gies fall short.90 Drug innovations pose special problems, with a large industry
that argues aggressively that prices need to be high enough to reward manufac-
turers for their research costs.91 On the other hand, the studies cited suggest
that many newer technologies and advanced procedures do produce real
improvements in patient health.
Technology puts the policymaker between Scylla and Charybdis: it offers
providers and patients tools for improved treatment and simultaneously allows
them to charge more. Patients do not fret about the cost of new technology if
they have good insurance, and too many providers want the new even if it lacks
evidence of efficacy. Both government and private payers are cautious about
resisting innovations, afraid they will be accused of condoning rationing, and
the federal government has had at least one hand tied behind its back since the
87 Frank R. Lichtenberg, Has Medical Innovation Reduced Cancer Mortality? 15 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15880, 2010), available at http://www.nber.
org/papers/w15880.
88 See generally Frank R. Lichtenberg, Abstract, The Quality of Medical Care, Behavioral
Risk Factors, and Longevity Growth, 11 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. ECON. 1, 1 (2011).
89 Id. (“This paper examines the effect of the quality of medical care, behavioral risk factors
(obesity, smoking, and AIDS incidence), and other variables (education, income, and health
insurance coverage) on life expectancy and medical expenditure using longitudinal state-
level data.”).
90 Emanuel, supra note 84.
91 For a recent display of this argument, see JORGE MESTRE-FERRANDIZ ET AL., OFFICE OF
HEALTH ECON., THE MANY FACES OF INNOVATION: A REPORT FOR THE ABPI BY THE OFFICE
OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 51 (2d ed. 2012), available at http://www.abpi.org.uk/our-work/
library/industry/Pages/many-faces-of-innovation.aspx (The report was commissioned by the
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI)).
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mid-1990s, the result of congressional defunding of the Office of Technology
Assessment.92
Without aggressive evaluation of new technologies and pushback by pay-
ers, we are left with providers who will buy new unproven and expensive medi-
cal tools, generate new tests and procedures of little benefit, and drive costs
higher and higher. Hospitals, for example, will always want the new so they
can market their cutting-edge technology to attract patients and better physi-
cians to their staffs. The end result is that we come to view the newest technol-
ogies as proxies for higher quality in health care. As David Squires writes,
“[t]his combination of pervasive medical technology and high prices showcases
two potent drivers of U.S. health spending, and a possible explanation for the
outsized share of resources we dedicate to health care relative to the rest of the
world.”93
B. Physician Spending: Unnecessary Care
Providers, particularly physicians, direct our individual care as our agents,
shopping on our behalf when our ignorance renders us unable to make shop-
ping decisions.94 Physician-directed purchasing has long been criticized for
buying unnecessary or wasteful care.95 How much health care is unnecessary?
Shannon Brownlee has argued that up to one-third of our health care dollars are
spent on care that does nothing to improve our health.96 The aggregate costs of
surgery, diagnostic tests, and drugs eat up our health care budgets, often with
little or no proven value. It represents a wasteful product. Some experienced
health care analysts believe for example that “[t]he opportunity for waste
reduction in health care is enormous.”97 By contrast, other long-time health
care observers are less sanguine.98 Reducing waste seems intuitively obvious, a
sensible ideal, although waste theory has been criticized since the 1990s for
ignoring the difficulty in defining and reducing waste.99 Waste is often the
byproduct of diagnostic or treatment uncertainty, and until that uncertainty is
reduced, waste remains likely.
92 The Office of Technology Assessment was killed by Congress in 1995 during a particu-
larly virulent congressional budget cutting session. See Technology Assessment and Con-
gress, OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT ARCHIVE, http://www.fas.org/ota/technology_assessment
_and_congress/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
93 Squires, supra note 73, at 9.
94 Barry R. Furrow, Physician Payment Reform: Plugging the Drain, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
821, 822, 829 (1990) (noting the limitations on the role of physicians as economic agents of
patients) [hereinafter Furrow, Physician Payment Reform].
95 Id. at 822–23, 852.
96 SHANNON BROWNLEE, OVERTREATED: WHY TOO MUCH MEDICINE IS MAKING US SICKER
AND POORER 5 (2007).
97 Berwick & Hackbarth, supra note 18, at 1513.
98 Callahan, supra note 2, at 81 (“What then can be done about costs? There are a number
of ideas available to meet the challenge, few of them rooted in any experience or evidence.
The long-time favorite has been that of eliminating waste and inefficiency, which I liken to
keeping the dust out of a drafty house located in the middle of a desert.”).
99 The problems in the application of waste theory to medical technology has long been
noted. See, e.g., Maxwell J. Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containment and Medical Technol-
ogy: A Critique of Waste Theory, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 778, 778–79, 781–82 (1986).
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Broadly defined, waste includes several dimensions: failures of care deliv-
ery, failures of care coordination, overtreatment, administrative complexity,
pricing failures, and fraud and abuse.100 For U.S. health care overall, Berwick
and Hackbarth calculate that “the sum of the lowest estimates is $558 billion
per year, or 21% of national health expenditures; and the sum of midpoint esti-
mates is $910 billion per year, or 34%.”101
Overtreatment is a complicated problem. It includes care that lacks a
sound evidence basis but does not rise to the level of waste since we lack
sufficient evidence to move it from possibly effective to wasteful. It also
includes care provided in excess of clinical tests of necessity.102 Studies of
American medicine have found large practice variation around the country.103
John Wennberg, whose studies in this area are often cited, has analyzed states
and regions within states for variation in surgical and other practices.
Wennberg gives the example of patient time in intensive care units in the last
six months of life in selected teaching hospitals.104 The number of days ranged
from 11.4 at UCLA Medical Center to as low as 2.8 at Massachusetts General
Hospital.105 This has cost implications: the Dartmouth Atlas group looked at
total Medicare reimbursements per decedent (adjusted for condition) during
their last two years of life, and the amount spent per person ranged from
$25,000 to $100,000, with the mean being around $48,000.106 The Dartmouth
Atlas details wide variations in cost and practice approaches around the
country.107
The causes of this variation are multiple and difficult to fix.108 Procedures
least subject to variation are those for which there is a professional consensus
100 See Berwick & Hackbarth, supra note 18, at 1513–14 (explaining each of these elements
of waste).
101 Id. at 1514.
102 For a discussion of unnecessary implantations, see Sana M. Al-Khatib et al., Non-Evi-
dence-Based ICD Implantations in the United States, 305 JAMA 43, 48 (2011) (more than
40% of the total number of implanted ICDs are not based on evidence). Congress has even
researched the problem of unnecessary implant procedures. See S. COMM. ON FIN., 111TH
CONG., STAFF REP. ON CARDIAC STENT USAGE AT ST. JOSEPH MEDICAL CENTER 57, at 4–5,
10, 14 (Comm. Print 2010) (describing the overuse of stenting at one hospital and the cost to
Medicare of such unnecessary procedures).
103 See, e.g., John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for
Action, 3 HEALTH AFF. 6, 9–15 (1984) (contending that norms of medical practice allow for
a “wide range of professional discretion” and thus can result in significant differences in how
patients are treated); Understanding of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Health Care
System, DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org (last visited
Apr. 7, 2013) (using Medicare data to show “glaring variations in how medical resources are
distributed and used in the United States”).
104 DARTMOUTH ATLAS PROJECT, THE CARE OF PATIENTS WITH SEVERE CHRONIC ILLNESS:
AN ONLINE REPORT ON THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 10 (2006), http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/
downloads/atlases/2006_Chronic_Care_Atlas.pdf.
105 Id. at 24.
106 Id. at 47.
107 See id. at 4; see also Wennberg, supra note 103, at 9. Wennberg is the author of the
Dartmouth Atlas, which uses Medicare data to track medical practice variation over the
country, by procedure. See Tools, DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE, http://www.
dartmouthatlas.org/tools/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
108 Wennberg concludes that system causes of unwarranted variation include misuse of
preference-sensitive care; poor communication between the doctor and patient regarding the
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on the preferred place or style of treatment.109 It is clear that modern medicine
still lacks validation for many treatment modalities.110 A recent study of
advanced diagnostic imaging concluded that its costs and benefits have not
been well-studied or justified. The authors concluded:
The increase in use of advanced diagnostic imaging has almost certainly con-
tributed to both improved patient care processes and outcomes, but there are remark-
ably few data to quantify the benefits of imaging. Given the high costs of imaging—
estimated at $100 billion annually—and the potential risks of cancer and other
harms, these benefits should be quantified and evidence-based guidelines for using
imaging should be developed that clearly balance benefits against financial costs and
health risk.111
We need to know more about treatments and what they achieve, more
about differences in practice styles and the variation created, and more about
what works and the limits to the use of treatments.
risks and benefits of alternative treatments; patient dependency on a physician’s opinion in
sorting out preferences; inadequate evaluation of (evolving) treatment theory; and the effects
of our health care finance system that rewards procedures, not time spent with patients or the
quality of decision making. See generally John E. Wennberg, Variation in Use of Medicare
Services Among Regions and Selected Academic Medical Centers: Is More Better?, 8 COM-
MONWEALTH FUND, Dec. 2005, at 4, available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_
doc/874_wennbert_variation_medicaresvcs.pdf (noting “striking regional variations in the
proportion of early stage breast cancer patients who undergo lumpectomy” and identifying
“idiosyncratic practice style” as the “major source of such widely varying discretionary sur-
gery rates”). For a graphic depiction of the variation, see John E. Wennberg, Active Emeritus
Professor of Community & Family Medicine and of The Dartmouth Institute, Keynote Lec-
ture at the Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s National Forum in Orlando, Florida:
Understanding Practice Patterns: A Focus on What the Quality Movement Can Do to Reduce
Unwarranted Variations 4, 8 (Dec. 14, 2005), available at http://www.ghdonline.org/
uploads/Wenneberg_IHI_lecture_December051.pdf; John E. Wennberg et al., Evaluating the
Efficiency of California Providers in Caring for Patients with Chronic Illnesses, HEALTH
AFF. 526, 530–38 (Nov. 16, 2005), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/11/16/
hlthaff.w5.526.full.pdf. See also Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Hap-
hazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 382–83
(2002) (recognizing physicians’ traditional reliance on personal experience and anecdotal
information).
109 Wennberg’s studies are based on three categories of care: effective care, preference-
sensitive care, and supply-sensitive care. Effective care describes interventions that are
viewed as medically necessary on the basis of clinical outcomes evidence and for which the
benefits so outweigh the risks that virtually all patients with medical need should receive
them. Preference-sensitive care includes treatments, such as discretionary surgery, for which
there are two or more valid treatment alternatives, and the choice of treatment involves
tradeoffs that should be based on patients’ preferences. Supply-sensitive care includes ser-
vices, mostly for patients with chronic illness, such as physician visits, referrals to special-
ists, hospitalizations and stays in intensive care units involved in the medical (non-surgical)
management of disease. Executive Summary, THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE,
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/pages/executive_summary (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
110 The resistance of physicians to externally imposed standards and values is a recurrent
theme in American health care. For an excellent summary and analysis of the reasons for this
recalcitrance, see Sandra H. Johnson, Regulating Physician Behavior: Taking Doctors’ “Bad
Law” Claims Seriously, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 973, 973–75, 992–1008 (2009).
111 Rebecca Smith-Bindman et al., Use of Diagnostic Imaging Studies and Associated Radi-
ation Exposure for Patients Enrolled in Large Integrated Health Care Systems, 1996–2010,
307 JAMA 2400, 2408 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-3\NVJ308.txt unknown Seq: 18 17-JUN-13 10:35
Spring 2013] COST CONTROL AND THE ACA 839
C. Exuberant Patients: Spending Others’ Money
Patients are a common target for cost control. Worried about our health,
overoptimistic about the power of modern medicine, and insured for most of
our expenses, we may spend more than is either efficient or healthy on our
treatments. We are price-insensitive. If a hundred-dollar treatment yields a
measurable “value” of seventy-five dollars, we would not buy such a treatment
if we paid out of pocket; if, however, we pay only twenty-five dollars and
receive the seventy-five-dollar value, it is worth it to us. Although we do pay
more total dollars out of pocket, we pay a smaller percentage (13%) of our
health care costs out of pocket through deductibles and copayments than most
of our counterparts: France pays 8%, Germany 13%, Canada 15%, Japan 17%,
and Switzerland 32%.112
People’s tastes can also affect demand for health care, and Americans
have a strong appetite. Cultural norms can encourage a desire for health care.
One poll found that 34% of Americans thought that “modern medicine [could]
cure almost any illness,” compared to only 27% of Canadians and 11% of
Germans.113 These American attitudes are likely to lead to greater trust in and
reliance on advanced medical procedures.114
A popular proposal from market advocates is the use of consumer-directed
health plans with high deductibles, shifting costs onto consumers to slow their
spending.115 Consumers will miraculously become smart shoppers. Cost shift-
ing to consumers has been going on for a long time, and consumer-directed
health care is the newest variant. If patients can shop and select their care, using
their own money, they will be sensitive to price and cost, and a major cost
reducer will take over—the sharp price-sensitivity of the buyer.116 If it works
with plasma televisions and cars, surely the health care marketplace is next.
The consumer who bears a $4,000 deductible will avoid unneeded trips to the
doctor and be cost-conscious during visits.
The reality is that in this flawed market model consumers are far less
likely to fill prescriptions or go to the doctor at all. Unable to choose between
essential and non-essential care, and wanting to avoid spending money that is at
risk, they are going to avoid going to the doctor. Workers with consumer-
driven plans are healthier simply because the healthy workers are more likely to
112 CHRIS L. PETERSON & RACHEL BURTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34175, U.S.
HEALTH CARE SPENDING: COMPARISON WITH OTHER OECD COUNTRIES 35–36 & fig.21
(2007).
113 Minah Kim, Robert J. Blendon & John M. Benson, How Interested Are Americans in
New Medical Technologies?: A Multicountry Comparison, 20 HEALTH AFF. 194, 198 tbl.4
(2001). Such beliefs may be uniquely American in our level of belief in unproven benefits
and unseen saviors. For example, nearly eighty percent of Americans believe in angels as
well. Poll: Nearly 8 in 10 Americans Believe in Angels, CBS NEWS (Dec. 23, 2011, 8:25
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57347634/poll-nearly-8-in-10-americans-
believe-in-angels/.
114 PETERSON & BURTON, supra note 112, at 37.
115 TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER-
DRIVEN MOVEMENT 120 (2007).
116 Id. at 17–19.
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switch to consumer-driven plans than their less-healthy counterparts.117 This
marketplace fantasy underpins a great many conservative health care ideas.
Health care is not a marketplace.118 A market requires transparency of
prices.119 The prices of most services are now opaque, undiscoverable, and
variable by insurance status for hospital care.120 The price of our insurance at
work may be transparent, but our employers have already limited our choices to
almost nothing. Shifting the perils of shopping risks onto consumers means
very little; they cannot shop on the basis of price except for over-the-counter
drug products at the local pharmacy.121
The second market problem when shifting the risk of health care “shop-
ping” onto consumers anywhere near the point of service is that they are ill-
equipped to know what is “necessary” care absent a medical education. In other
words, they will sometimes buy too little of what turns out to have been neces-
sary care. This may save money now but, from a national budget perspective,
will require care at much higher cost later if necessary care is delayed. We use
physicians as our agents for the very reason that we do not often know enough
to really “shop,” at least for care. We may be able to shop for the best hospitals
or physicians in some cases, and the ACA and CMS will support us in our
efforts, as we will see, but most of the time we lack the skill and incentives to
shop meaningfully.
The third problem of shifting risks and burdens onto consumers in too
draconian a fashion is that, unlike most markets we participate in, health care is
not recognizably a “good” like consumer goods or houses or stocks. Health
care is not a good—only its expected benefits are. As Robert Evans observes,
[t]he individual who undergoes care is by no means a “beneficiary,” to be envied by
his fellow citizens, but an unfortunate who, given the option, would gladly forego
both the care and the accompanying episode of illness or injury. Two weeks in the
hospital costs much more than a two-week tropical vacation, but the individual who
enjoys the former is not better off, on any measure, than the one who undergoes the
latter.122
117 For a critique of these assumptions, see id. at 120.
118 Furrow, Physician Payment Reform, supra note 94, at 827–30 (discussing the problems
with a market analysis in health care).
119 Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of
Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57, 67–68 (2006) (prices for health care goods and services in the
U.S. are opaque; making consumer-directed health care very unlikely to succeed without
major changes).
120 Tara Siegel Bernard, Getting Lost in the Labyrinth of Medical Bills, N.Y. TIMES, June
23, 2012, at B1.
121 We do find some price resistance in cancer patients, as private insurers today make
patients pay a larger share of their drug bills. Drug companies have adopted a strategy with
expensive drugs of offering to pay the patient’s share of the drug cost, which keeps soaring
costs out of sight and less painful. The most expensive cancer drugs for example have inelas-
tic demand since dying patients place a high value on their short remaining life. Firms can
exact high prices. As one doctor notes, “[a]t some point it’s just corporate
chutzpah . . . . There’s no check in the system.” The Costly War on Cancer, ECONOMIST,
May 28, 2011, at 67–68, available at http://www.economist.com/node/18743951 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
122 Robert G. Evans, Tension, Compression, and Shear: Directions, Stresses, and Outcomes
of Health Care Cost Control, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 101, 124 n.9 (1990).
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Shopping for chemotherapy may be desirable but it is not pleasurable—it
is to be avoided whenever possible. If we are incentivized to have to bear the
financial risk of our choices, we may just try to avoid thinking about them,
since going to the doctor will chew up our deductible in an economy that has
already shrunk our real wages.
D. Negotiated Prices: Bargaining Disparities
The American health care industry is highly fragmented, with 2300 sepa-
rate entities making up the general acute-care industry. One study concluded
that “[n]o other industry, particularly one so vital to the broader economy, even
closely approaches this level of fragmentation.”123 Fragmentation means ineffi-
ciency, duplication, and higher cost in most industries. Economies of scale and
bargaining power are missing. Multiple payers, mixing private and several pub-
lic payers, can only increase prices. In countries with all-payer regulation, sin-
gle payers can bargain effectively with doctors, hospitals, and pharmaceutical
companies, and can also set enforceable spending targets.124 A complicated
multi-payer system covered by fee-for-service payments for specialty care also
has pernicious effects on the distribution of medical specialties, with cost impli-
cations. The United States, for example, has a much higher ratio of specialists
to primary care physicians, which most likely reflects the higher level of spe-
cialist pay.125 It is also clear that the high cost of medical education pushes
young doctors toward higher paying specialties.126
Our fragmented system limits buyer-negotiating power when facing prov-
iders. If insurers lack power to negotiate lower rates, physicians and hospi-
tals—paid more to do more regardless of outcome—will do more.127 Fee-for-
service payment and bonusing systems maximize these incentives.128 Physi-
123 JAMES BURGDORFER ET AL., GOVERNANCE INST., HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION TRENDS IN
TODAY’S HEALTHCARE ENVIRONMENT 11 (2010).
124 Jonathan Oberlander & Joseph White, Public Attitudes Toward Health Care Spending
Aren’t the Problem; Prices Are, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1285, 1289 (2009) (The authors observe
that “[o]ther nations achieve lower prices by paying for health services through either a
single-payer or coordinated, multi-payer systems that set or negotiate fees with all providers.
Analysts who seek greater productivity in medical care should recognize that productivity
can be increased simply by paying less per service. Other OECD health systems also spend
much less on administration, both because insurance is simpler and because providers do not
face the burden of dealing with myriad payers and payment rules.”) (footnotes omitted).
125 Bruce C. Vladeck, Fixing Medicare’s Physician Payment System, 362 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1955, 1956 (2010).
126 PETERSON & BURTON, supra note 112, at 17–19.
127 One classic study examined a clinic that switched from salary to commission on fees
generated. As a result, doctors scheduled more appointments and ordered more blood tests
and x-rays. See David Hemenway et al., Physicians’ Responses to Financial Incentives:
Evidence from a For-Profit Ambulatory Care Center, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1059, 1059–62
(1990) (concluding that switching from fee for service to a bonus system leads physicians to
change their practice style; the authors concluded that “[t]he system of monetary rewards
appears to have led virtually all the physicians to increase the number of patient visits and
the rate of diagnostic testing.”).
128 See JUDY ANN BIGBY ET AL., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PHYSICIAN
PAYMENT REFORM 3 (2013), http://physicianpaymentcommission.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/02/physician_payment_report.pdf (“The commission’s recommendations focus on the
near-term, calling for drastic changes to the current fee-for-service payment system and a
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cians become quality-insensitive and income-sensitive. If physicians then risk
losing money on higher-quality care, it is not surprising that such care is not
regularly offered.129 The result is high prices charged by health professionals.
Providers in many markets use their negotiating clout to get higher prices
from commercial health plans; Robert Berenson writes that “hospital and physi-
cian payment rate increases that outpace the rate of cost increases are major
contributors to rising premiums for employer-sponsored insurance. Providers’
growing negotiating strength also enables them to modify contract terms,
blocking health plans’ attempts to steer patients to low-cost providers.”130 A
Massachusetts study found that health care cost increases in the state had been
driven mostly by hospitals’ and physician groups’ market dominance, not by
the cost of providing the actual care.131
Hospital pricing reflects this multiplicity of payers and the variable pricing
that results.132 One study found that hospital charges varied seventeen fold
across California hospitals, but these charges were typically much higher than
what was actually paid by insurers and the government.133 The government-
controlled systems of Canada, Europe, and Japan grant much more market
power to the buy side, and their national health care costs reflect this bargaining
power.134
Administrative Costs. We have a health care system that is administra-
tively costly compared to single-payer systems around the world, or indeed any
industrialized country’s system. Our median per capita spending on health
five-year transition to a physician-payment system that rewards quality and value-based care.
The recommendations pertain to the way physicians are paid throughout the health care
system—both public and private payers.”).
129 See, e.g., Ian Urbina, In the Treatment of Diabetes, Success Often Does Not Pay, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/11/nyregion/ny
regionspecial5/11diabetes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
130 Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some Providers to Win Steep Payment
Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed, 31 HEALTH AFF. 973,
973 (2012).
131 MARTHA COAKLEY, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST
TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS 38–40 (2010), available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/
healthcare/2011-hcctd-full.pdf.
132 Reinhardt, supra note 119, at 67.
Asked by a Wall Street Journal reporter to explain how U.S. hospitals price their services,
William McGowan, chief financial officer of the University of California, Davis, Health System
and thirty-year veteran of hospital financing, responded: “There is no method to this madness. As
we went through the years, we had these cockamamie formulas. We multiplied our costs to set
our charges.”
. . . In 2004, for example, U.S. hospitals were actually paid only about 38 percent of their
“charges” by patients or their insurers. The actual prices they were paid appear to vary much less
than “charges” do, although even that variation is remarkable [sic] large. For example, in 2001
the prices hospitals were actually paid by private health insurers serving the Federal Employees
Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) varied by “only” 259 percent across the United States.
Id. at 57 (footnotes omitted). See also Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Kill-
ing Us, TIME, Mar. 4, 2013, at 16, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,2136864,00.html (lengthy discussion of the hospital “chargemaster” and the tremen-
dous variation in hospital charges depending on who is paying for the service).
133 Reinhardt, supra note 119, at 57.
134 Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States Is So Different
from Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89, 102 (2003).
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administration and insurance was seven times that of the OECD median ($465
compared to $66), based on twenty-one countries that reported in 2004,135 and
there is no reason to expect any improvement in that differential today. The
United States, by one estimate, spends $361 billion annually on health care
administration, half of which is unnecessary and therefore better spent on use-
ful medical services to patients in need.136 The federal government has taken a
chunk out of these administrative costs through several approaches; one of the
biggest steps predates the ACA, and that is the Health Information Technology
for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, which provides financial
incentives for the acquisition of EHRs through its “meaningful use” require-
ment and specifies standards for the electronic transmission of clinical data.137
If these standards were expanded for example to include electronic transmis-
sion of administrative data, like billing information, as much as $2 billion could
be saved annually. Combined with other reforms, one economist recently esti-
mated that as much as $40 billion annually could be saved.138
E. Dying Too Slowly: Death-Denying Consumers
The population of the United States is steadily aging, and older people,
particularly those over eighty, require a great deal of health care. This aging has
been accompanied by increases in male and female life expectancy, with males’
increase at birth going from 76.2 years in 2010 to 79.9 years in 2030; for
females, the gains are more modest, from 80.5 years to 81.9 years.139 We are
living longer, and this means higher health care costs for this growing cohort of
aging citizens. We spend a great deal on end-of-life care, and some critics con-
tend that we need a new attitude toward death, welcoming hospice care and
refusing high-cost care that gains only a few weeks of life at the end.140
A hard look at the data suggests however that only a small proportion of
the general growth in health care costs is explained by end-of-life care
increases, perhaps seven percent over the past thirty years. As people reach the
age of sixty-five, they become eligible for Medicare (and for Medicaid if they
are financially needy). Additionally, if they retire, they cease contributing to the
Medicare trust fund and reduce payments of the taxes that support Medicaid.
135 PETERSON & BURTON, supra note 112, at 29 (“Spending on health insurance and admin-
istration can be broken into three parts. The largest part, at least in the United States, com-
prises the difference between earned premiums and incurred benefits of private health
insurers. This difference accounts for insurers’ administrative costs, net additions to reserves,
rate credits and dividends, premium taxes, and profits or losses. The next largest part com-
prises the administrative expenses of government programs. The smallest part comprises the
expenses associated with health activities of philanthropies.”).
136 David Cutler, Elizabeth Wikler & Peter Basch, Reducing Administrative Costs and
Improving the Health Care System, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1875, 1876 (2012).
137 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, Pub.
L. No. 111–5, 123 Stat. 226–29, 246–47, 467–70 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. § 300jj (2012)).
138 Cutler, Wikler & Basch, supra note 136, at 1877–78.
139 See Gary King & Samir Soneji, Abstract, The Future of Death in America, 25 DEMO-
GRAPHIC RES. 1, 1 (2011), www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol25/1/25-1.pdf.
140 Daniel Callahan is most identified with this point of view. See Callahan, supra note 2, at
82.
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The growth in the ‘‘very old’’ segment of the population also disproportion-
ately affects public programs, which bear most of the cost of the very expensive
long-term care consumed by this population. As Medicaid is the primary source
of payment for nursing-home care in the United States, demographic shifts
have hit Medicaid particularly hard. Although the elderly make up around ten
percent of the Medicaid population, they account for twenty-five percent of the
program’s costs.141
In spite of these cost concerns, the United States has one of the youngest
populations of any developed nation, and all other countries have been able to
keep their health care expenditures well below ours despite their older popula-
tions.142 “Some of the best research shows that, although healthcare costs will
begin to rise as baby-boomers age, the impact will be modest in comparison to
that of other cost drivers, such as inflation and technological innovation,” per-
haps as little as one percent per year until 2036.143 The cost problem with the
elderly in the United States is often poor coordination of care, with too many
drugs given to patients with insufficient attention to side effects and interac-
tions. More can be done to alter attitudes toward death and reduce end-of-life
spending that is a poor value. The old and the aging are not, however, the
primary driver of high health care costs.
Medical malpractice reform. I have not granted medical malpractice
reform the status of a “usual suspect.” It is rather an “also ran.” Such reform is
often touted as a significant cost-saving mechanism for physicians without
regard to its possible value as a tool for patient safety. The primary driver of
such reforms are physicians and their medical societies, with the goal of reduc-
ing their insurance premiums and their risk of ever being named as a defendant.
Such selfish policy motivations are nothing new in health care politics. How-
ever, such reforms are hopelessly one-sided, ignoring patient safety issues and
the high levels of adverse events that patients experience. Given the high level
of medical adverse events in the United States, it is clear that the real problem
with medical adverse events is underclaiming—too few patients ever file
claims for adverse events, even serious ones.144
The overall evidence on health care savings from tort reform is ambiguous
at best, with a small additional cost arguably imposed by malpractice litigation.
However, no analysis is complete without pricing the benefits that tort litigation
creates for improved safety and reduction of patient injury. One recent sum-
mary concludes that the “accumulation of recent evidence finding zero or small
effects suggests that it is time for policymakers to abandon the hope that tort
141 See THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A PRIMER,
23 fig.13 (2010), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7334-04.pdf.
142 See Joseph White, (How) Is Aging a Health Policy Problem?, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y
L. & ETHICS 47, 50 (2004).
143 Mythbusters, Myth: The Aging Population Is to Blame for Uncontrollable Healthcare
Costs, CANADIAN HEALTH SERVICES RES. FOUND. 1 (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.chsrf.ca/
publicationsandresources/Mythbusters/ArticleView/11-02-22/f20f6cb8-bfd0-453e-b470-6f
b63c93a629.aspx.
144 See generally Barry R. Furrow, Adverse Events and Patient Injury: Coupling Detection,
Disclosure, and Compensation, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 440, 448–57 (2012) (proposing
new regulatory strategies to discover and penalize adverse events that now go unreported
and undetected).
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reform can be a major element in health-care cost control.”145 Eisenberg, hav-
ing surveyed the empirical work to date on tort reform generally, concludes that
[e]vidence of the effect of tort reform in the medical malpractice field is mixed. Caps
on non-economic damages have reduced costs, thereby likely decreasing pressure on
hospitals to improve care. Consistent evidence of effects on physician behavior and
physician supply has not emerged. Tort reform has rarely sought to address the well-
established problem of widespread harm caused by poor quality care.146
Recent studies point to the merits of expanded tort liability in inducing
major patient safety initiatives.147 Reforming tort litigation may be justified by
other arguments such as improvement of compensation or patient safety
improvements. The Congressional Budget Office has calculated that implemen-
tation of tort reforms nationally might “reduce total national health care
expenditures by about 0.2 percent.”148 “The CBO also noted, however, that tort
reform cost reductions might increase overall patient mortality rates by limiting
the rights of patients to sue.”149 Any figure that fails to include possible safety
benefits from such litigation cannot be trusted.150
II. CRAMP APPETITES: TEST “GOOD BUT PAINFUL IDEAS”151
A variety of strategies are being tried to improve health care quality, and
many of these strategies predate the ACA but are being accelerated by it.152
Here is a list of provisions of the ACA that aim at bending the cost curve, either
directly or indirectly153:
• Health insurance exchanges. Exchanges are expected to facilitate consumer shop-
ping for insurance plans that are transparently marketed, presumably allowing for
rational choices of lower-cost plans if so desired by consumers. Insurers would
compete on the insurance product’s cost and quality.154
• Taxes on high-cost insurance plans. The ACA limits the tax exclusion for
employer health insurance, thereby reducing employer selection of more expensive
health plans and discouraging high use.155
145 Myungho Paik et al., Will Tort Reform Bend the Cost Curve?: Evidence from Texas, 9 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 173, 175–76 (2012).
146 Theodore Eisenberg, The Empirical Effects of Tort Reform, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS (Jennifer H. Arlen ed., forthcoming Nov. 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2032740.
147 Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Litigation as a
Curative Tool, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 49–50 (2011) [hereinafter Furrow, Epidemic] (summa-
rizing evidence that more, rather than less, malpractice litigation will spur patient safety
efforts and lower the levels of adverse events in the long run).
148 Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Orrin G. Hatch, U.S.
Senator (Oct. 9, 2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/
106xx/doc10641/10-09-tort_reform.pdf.
149 Furrow, Epidemic, supra note 147, at 43 n.7.
150 See generally id. at 49–50.
151 Callahan, supra note 2, at 81.
152 I have discussed the range of ACA strategies in Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety,
supra note 19, at 1731–33.
153 See Horney & Van de Water, supra note 21, at 5.
154 Id. at 6.
155 Id.
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• Reducing administrative costs. Standardization of insurer-provider transactions—
enrollment, eligibility, prior authorization, and so on—will reduce administrative
overhead and thereby reduce system costs overall.156
• Researching comparative effectiveness. The ACA creates several new entities to
fund research on outcomes, comparative effectiveness, and best practices.157 As I
will show, such research has great potential to reduce costs and improve quality.
• Promoting prevention and wellness. The ACA has a range of provisions to
encourage disease prevention and promote wellness and healthy behaviors; these
include the expansion of preventive service coverage in Medicare, Medicaid, and
private insurance.158
• Licensing follow-on biologics. The ACA promotes the use of generic drugs
through an accelerated approval process, therefore allowing purchasers to buy
lower cost equivalent drugs.159
• Strengthening primary care. The ACA pushes hard at the improvement of primary
care through better coordination, qualified medical homes, and increased payments
to primary care providers.160
• Establishing quality measures and priorities. The ACA defines quality in health
services and outcomes, developing “new patient-centered and population-based
measures of quality.”161
• Promoting high-value care. The ACA continues the existing government strategies
of a value-based payment system, paying for performance.162
• Establishing a center for innovation. A center for innovation is created with the
goal of testing alternative payment structures and approaches to patient-centered
care, quality improvement, and cost reductions in federal programs.163
• Enhancing program integrity. The ACA has bolstered fraud and abuse enforce-
ment through numerous provisions, including strengthened legal requirements for
preventing fraud and abuse and for maximizing its detection through increased
penalties and increased funding for enforcement.164
• Reducing avoidable hospital readmissions. The ACA mandates that CMS reduce
readmission rates under the Medicare program by reducing reimbursement, creat-
ing sharp penalties for hospitals if they do not reduce their avoidable
readmissions.165
• Promoting accountable care organizations. A range of new delivery models, from
accountable care organizations (ACOs)—physician-led organizations responsible
for the cost and quality of delivered care—to medical homes are promoted through
shared savings of any Medicare moneys saved by the implementation of good
practices.166
• Facilitating payment bundling. Bundled payments for Medicare services would
force coordination and integration of cost-effective care.167
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 7.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 7–8.
166 Id. at 8.
167 Id.
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These Affordable Care Act proposals together have the potential to reduce
costs over time, but it is unclear whether they will be enough. One cynical
commentator calls some of these ideas “faith-based cost control.”168 Critics
may however end up surprised at the effects of a range of proposals in our
complex system where incentives often work at cross purposes. The ACA ideas
are already changing system organization and provider behavior.
A. Control Prices and Technology: From Payment Incentives to IPAB
The United States has built new health care industries, in Robert Evans’
words, to “share the rich financial feast of health care costs.”169 Monopoly
power gives the payer the ability to offset the organizational power of physi-
cians,170 increasingly concentrated hospitals, and industries that produce medi-
cal technologies and drugs. Absent this monopoly power by a single payer or
small group, the horde of private insurers and the competitive environment add
to costs but not care. As Evans wrote more than twenty years ago:
A large and growing share of the American total is spent, not on doctors and nurses,
but on accountants, management consultants, and public relations specialists. Their
contribution to the health of the American public is difficult to discern (unless one is
trained in neoclassical economics and able to see with the eye of faith).171
His observations are still accurate today in describing our fragmented sys-
tem of payment. If we want real cost control, we need stronger control of the
payment process, either through a single payer or highly regulated multiple
payers, like Germany. The evidence of Canada is instructive. Evans observes
that the competitive, fragmented U.S. environment
has thus permitted physicians to push their fees steadily upward, in the face of rapid
and sustained increases in their numbers and output. . . . In Canada, the introduction
of universal public insurance coverage coincided with the introduction of periodically
bargained uniform fee schedules in each province that were binding on all practition-
ers. Under this fee-setting process, fee levels have roughly stabilized in real terms.172
And if we want, at the same time, to avoid a deeply tiered and unequal
system of health care, then we must, in Uwe Reinhardt’s words, “enlist govern-
ment somehow to impose on total health spending an annual budget that cannot
grow faster than ability to pay—say, the rate of growth of gross domestic prod-
uct per capita.”173
168 Gina Kolata, The ABC’s of the Health Care Law and Its Future, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,
2012, at D5.
169 Evans, supra note 122, at 123 n.7 (contrasting the Canadian single payer approach to
America’s fragmented health care world).
170 Id. at 117.
171 Id. at 115.
172 Id. at 116.
173 Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Fork in the Road for Health Care, N.Y. TIMES BLOGS (May 25,
2012, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/the-fork-in-the-road-for-
health-care/.
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1. Price Controls
The ACA has taken several steps in the direction of more control of prices.
a. The Independent Payment Advisory Board
The Independent Payment Advisory Board, or IPAB, is the most clearly
defined price-control mechanism in the ACA (and therefore the most politically
vulnerable). The IPAB’s mission is to develop and submit detailed proposals to
Congress and the President to reduce Medicare spending and improve the qual-
ity of care. The IPAB is designed as an expert, independent group, thereby
increasing the ability of the IPAB to make controversial budget-cutting deci-
sions while insulated from the possibility of congressional overrides. The
potential power of the IPAB is immense. Peter Orszag, the administration’s
former director of the Office of Management and Budget, has claimed that
IPAB represents “the largest yielding of sovereignty from the Congress since
the creation of the Federal Reserve.”174
The hope is that the IPAB process, which removes much of Congress’s
discretionary authority over recommendations on rates, will lead to Medicare
payment decisions that are closer to the social optimum. It is a fifteen-mem-
ber agency created in 2010 by the ACA, sections 3403 and 10320. The goal of
the IPB is to achieve savings in Medicare without affecting coverage or quality.
The IPAB replaces MedPAC and grants it the authority to make changes to the
Medicare program, leaving Congress the power of overruling its decisions. The
Board must recommend approaches to reduce Medicare spending by specified
amounts if spending exceeded target growth rates. If they fail, the Secretary of
HHS must develop a proposal and implement it. The hope is that the Board will
manage to subject the Medicare program to spending limits through savings
targets.175 Any such attempts will meet ferocious Congressional opposition,
however.176
The IPAB was designed to tackle Medicare’s Physician Fee Schedule,
with the long-term goal of a national system of value-based payment.177 As one
study observed, “[a]lthough the huge federal Medicare program . . . possess[es]
some monopsonistic purchasing power . . . the highly fragmented buy side of
the U.S. health system is relatively weak. The IPAB’s assignment is to harness
174 See Ezra Klein, Can We Control Costs Without Congress?, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2010,
2:46 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/03/can_we_control_costs_
without_c.html.
175 Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Explaining Health Reform: Medicare and the New Inde-
pendent Payment Advisory Board, FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM (May 2010), http://www.kff.
org/healthreform/upload/7961-02.pdf.
176 See, e.g., Bob Herman, House Approves IPAB Repeal, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (March 22,
2012), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/news-analysis/house-to-vote-today-on-ipab-
repeal.html.
177 Ann Marie Marciarille & J. Bradford DeLong, Bending the Health Cost Curve: The
Promise and Peril of the Independent Payment Advisory Board, 22 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.-
MED. 75, 99 (2012). See also Robert A. Berenson, Nat’l Inst. Health Care Mgmt. Found.,
Out of Whack: Pricing Distortions in the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule, EXPERT VOICES
(Sept. 2010), http://nihcm.org/pdf/NIHCM-EV-Berenson_FINAL.pdf.
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some of the monopsonistic purchasing power of the federal Medicare program
by reworking physician payment standards.”178
The long-run effects of the IPAB on health care costs—if the Board sur-
vives, and if its implementation is successful—might be enormous.
The IPAB, if it works, will harness the enormous purchasing power of the federal
Medicare program for the task of bending the cost curve not just for Medicare alone
but for health care in general by reworking physician payment standards. But if it is
to work at acceptable cost it must trigger improvements in the efficiency of the
health-care delivery system and not just say “no” to cost increases.179
As President Obama describes it, the IPAB will bring the Medicare physi-
cian compensation into the public forum “by strengthening an independent
commission of doctors, nurses, medical experts and consumers who will look at
all the evidence and recommend the best ways to reduce unnecessary spending
while protecting access to the services that seniors need.”180 The IPAB can
replace rubber-stamping of valuation of specialist-driven outpatient physician
services.
If the ACA succeeds in meeting the projections of the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), which projects a two percent reduction in the U.S. Gross
Domestric Product by 2040, the IPAB (if Congress does not handicap it)181 will
be a major force in slowing growth in physician charges, one of several initia-
tives slowing the growth of federal health care programs by a third over the
next generation.182
The ACA places some significant restrictions on the recommendations
that IPAB may put forward. It is “prohibited from making proposals that ration
care, raise taxes or Part B premiums, or change Medicare benefit, eligibility, or
cost-sharing standards.”183 In addition, for years prior to 2020, the Board may
not propose payment cuts to hospitals and perhaps for hospice services; physi-
cian payment however remains fair game for the Board.184
IPAB’s success will largely depend on the kinds of changes it recom-
mends, particularly whether its recommendations go beyond payment rates to
include proposals to change the methods of payment and beneficiary responsi-
bilities. IPAB’s successful implementation also depends on whether Congress
acquiesces in or resists cost-cutting as it has done repeatedly with respect to
physician payment under the SGR.185 IPAB will also have responsibility for
monitoring and making recommendations and proposals to Congress and the
178 Marciarille & DeLong, supra note 177, at 99 (quoting Anderson et al., supra note 134,
at 102) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179 Id. at 80.
180 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Fiscal Policy at George Wash-
ington University (Apr. 13, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2011/04/13/remarks-president-fiscal-policy.
181 Marciarille & DeLong, supra note 177, at 79–80.
182 Id. at 80.
183 Cal. Healthcare Inst., Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) Summary, CHI.ORG,
at 1 (2011), https://www.chi.org/uploadedFiles/Legislative_Action/Federal_Issues/CHI%20
IPAB%20Summary.pdf.
184 See Marciarille & DeLong, supra note 177, at 80, 94.
185 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Independent Payment Advisory Board, 363 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 103, 105 (2010), available at http://healthpolicyandreform.nejm.org/?p=3478.
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President every two years beginning in 2015 regarding how to slow the growth
of private expenditures on health care in the private sector.186
b. State Rate Regulation
This form of budgeting uses hard spending caps and regulatory controls to
limit the production and supply of services and technologies. State “certificate
of need” programs for hospital beds and high-cost capital equipment have oper-
ated as back-door cost control tools. State governments might revisit the merits
of rate regulation, which proved unpopular in the 1990s and was largely aban-
doned. More direct regulation of provider rates might set upper bounds on per-
missible rates negotiated between health plans and providers in relation to
Medicare rates.187
In [the heyday of rate regulation] in the 1970s and early 1980s, more than thirty
states were involved in reviewing or actually regulating hospital payment rates for all
public and private payers. A few states—including Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, West Virginia, and New York—had functioning, reasonably successful all-
payer programs. Although most of these states have since ended those programs,
Maryland and West Virginia’s rate setting program continues.188
It may be time to revisit rate regulation, given its relative success in earlier
decades, when states that had imposed mandatory controls on hospital rate
increases reduced their rate of growth compared to states lacking control.189 If
costs keep rising as a percentage of GDP, we are likely to reach a point where
low-value care has to be foregone in order to slow cost increases.190 Desperate
186 The House has already voted to kill the IPAB. See Robert Pear, House Votes to Kill a
Medicare Cost Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2012, at A13. Business groups are worried
about cost shifting to the private sector. See Legislative News, Physician Payment: Business
Groups Push for IPAB Repeal, Say Board Will Shift Costs to Private Sector, 22 MEDICARE
REP. (BNA), April 29, 2011, at 492. The White House responded with proposals to
strengthen IPAB, that would (1) lower the target of Medicare growth per beneficiary to GDP
per capita plus .5%, (2) “[g]ive IPAB additional tools to improve the quality of care while
reducing costs, including allowing it to promote value-based benefit designs,” and (3) “[pro-
vide] IPAB [with] additional enforcement mechanisms such as an automatic sequester” of
funds. See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: The President’s Framework for
Shared Prosperity and Shared Fiscal Responsibility (Apr. 13, 2011), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/13/fact-sheet-presidents-framework-shared-
prosperity-and-shared-fiscal-resp.
187 See Robert Murray, Setting Hospital Rates to Control Costs and Boost Quality: The
Maryland Experience, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1395, 1400–01 (2009).
188 Berenson et al., supra note 130, at 979.
189 John E. McDonough, Tracking the Demise of State Hospital Rate Setting, 16 HEALTH
AFF. 142, 143 (1997).
190 This is not a new problem for any health care system. Earlier periods of cost escalation
generated analyses of the need to cut back on “low value” care. See, e.g., Henry Aaron &
William B. Schwartz, Rationing Health Care: The Choice Before Us, 247 SCI. 418, 420–22
(1990) (“Physicians [under the British rationing system] make the denial of potentially bene-
ficial care seem routine, or even optimal, by recasting a problem of medical scarcity in
economic terms.”); David M. Eddy, What Care Is “Essential”? What Services Are
“Basic”?, 265 JAMA 782, 782–84 (1991) (discussing dilemmas of separating “essential”
and non-essential care); William B. Schwartz, The Inevitable Failure of Current Cost-Con-
tainment Strategies: Why They Can Provide Only Temporary Relief, 257 JAMA 220, 224
(1987) (arguing that “cutting back on kinds of care that have the lowest expected value” is
essential to appropriate allocation of resources); William B. Schwartz & Paul L. Joskow,
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times may breed desperate measures, although an anti-regulatory political cli-
mate may make this difficult until we hit a crisis point. As Robert Evans writes,
the pressures of the marketplace transmitted by individual patients have been totally
ineffective, and no civilized country relies on them in any serious way. . . . Pressures
exerted by a government, or quasi-governmental agency backed up by regulation,
actually do work, because they mobilize and strongly motivate those with the capac-
ity to do the job.191
c. State Insurance Regulation
The ACA does provide regulatory power to push back against large pre-
mium increases for provider contracts. Section 1003192 requires state insurance
departments to conduct an annual review of “unreasonable” increases in premi-
ums—increases of ten percent or more. Health insurers must justify premium
increases, which means that, theoretically, large-payment-rate increases in pro-
vider contracts could lead to disapproval of the premium increase. The ACA
promotes enhanced transparency of negotiated rates and increased scrutiny of
health-plan-rate increases. This exposes provider prices and could lead, at a
minimum, to pressures to restrain provider pricing. The power of provider pric-
ing in rising health spending could stimulate both market-oriented approaches
based on benefit designs that make consumers more aware of costs and give
them direct incentives to select low-cost options; tiered insurance networks
exemplify this approach. Employers are likely to be more willing to support
choice-limiting networks with few providers and this could help balance nego-
tiating leverage between providers and health plans.193
2. Technology Assessment
Medicare is our technology assessor at present for our largest public pro-
gram.194 It makes national coverage determinations about procedures and tech-
nologies, with a separate coverage decision for each new piece of technology
available to providers.195 “A national coverage decision for the use of a [new]
imaging technology or pharmaceutical therapy” affects who gets access and
when, levels of reimbursement if any, and whether a service is offered.196 The
ACA’s focus on comparative effectiveness research, best practices and out-
comes, and the dissemination of research findings is likely to strengthen Medi-
Medical Efficacy Versus Economic Efficiency: A Conflict in Values, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1462, 1464 (1978) (discussing possibility that medically efficacious care will have to be
sacrificed in pursuit of economic efficiency).
191 Evans, supra note 122, at 122.
192 The Affordable Care Act added Section 2794 to the Public Health Service Act of 1944,
including a provision that requires state insurance departments to conduct an annual review
of “unreasonable” increases in health insurance premiums, defined through regulation as an
increase of ten percent or more. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1003 (2010)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-94 (2012)).
193 See, e.g., Reinhardt, supra note 119, at 65.
194 See April M. Elliott, Note, Medicare as Technology Regulator: Medicare Policy’s Role
in Shaping Technology Use and Access, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1489, 1491–92, 1509
(2011).
195 Id. at 1509.
196 Id.
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care’s assessment potency. Commercial insurers have long piggybacked on
Medicare decisions about new technologies.197 They are likely to continue to
do so.
The bundled payment and coordination initiatives of the ACA also work
in tandem with research findings as part of technology assessment at the pro-
vider level. New technologies are likely to be purchased after careful assess-
ment, because the bundled payment model sets a limit on total payments per
episode of care in most cases. It promotes information on what works and at
what cost. As one commentator has written: “Because providers would not be
subject to coverage determinations altering payment rates, they would be incen-
tivized to purchase new technologies only when expected quality benefits and
cost-effectiveness justify the expenditure, while being discouraged from invest-
ing in unnecessarily risky or redundant technologies.”198
B. Rationalize Services: Of Fat, Waste, and Fraud
Waste and unproven or unnecessary products and tests are pervasive in the
U.S. health care system as we have seen with medical practice variation.199
Properly done testing can be both quality-enhancing and cost-reducing.200
Comparative effectiveness research has emerged as a central feature of health-
system reform.201 The ACA provides funds for research into a range of issues,
but it puts heavy emphasis on studies of health care delivery systems, including
payment systems and comparative clinical effectiveness. The ACA and its
many reform provisions have some power to slow what Emanuel calls “pseudo-
innovations”; he notes that we need to define innovation as things that really
work, by directing “capital and creativity away from technologies that don’t
improve outcomes or lower costs and toward ones that do. That should not be
confused with killing innovation.”202 The ACA establishes several new entities
and initiatives that have the potential to slow the adoption of new technologies.
197 See id. at 1498; see also JACOB S. HACKER, THE CASE FOR PUBLIC PLAN CHOICE IN
NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM: KEY TO COST CONTROL AND QUALITY COVERAGE, INST. FOR
AMERICA’S FUTURE, at 14, http://institute.ourfuture.org/files/Jacob_Hacker_Public_Plan_
Choice.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).
198 Elliott, supra note 194, at 1520.
199 See, e.g., Berwick & Hackbarth, supra note 18, at 1513; Allan S. Brett & Laurence B.
McCullough, Addressing Requests by Patients for Nonbeneficial Interventions, 307 JAMA
149, 150 (2012); Deborah Grady & Rita F. Redberg, Less Is More: How Less Health Care
Can Result in Better Health, 170 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 749, 749 (2010), available at
archinte.jamanetwork.com/Issue.aspx?journalid=71&issueID=5765&direction=P; 44 Per-
cent of Healthy Adults Getting Unneeded Heart Screenings, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG (Feb.
3, 2011), http://pressroom.consumerreports.org/pressroom/2011/02/my-entry.html.
200 Editorial, Treating You Better For Less, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2012, at SR12 (giving
examples of health system reforms that have produced substantial savings).
201 Measuring efficacy has long been viewed as a challenging task. For academic struggles
with the problem, see generally John P. Bunker, Is Efficacy the Gold Standard for Quality
Assessment?, 25 INQUIRY 51 (1988); Robert W. Dubois & Robert H. Brook, Assessing
Clinical Decision Making: Is the Ideal System Feasible?, 25 INQUIRY 59 (1988).
202 Emanuel, supra note 84 (emphasis omitted).
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1. The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute
The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (“PCORI”) is designed
to develop comparative effectiveness and other outcomes research.203 The
Institute has funded over fifty research projects so far and has opened its draft
of its national priorities for outcomes research for public comment.204 “The
purpose of the Institute is to assist patients, clinicians, purchasers, and policy-
makers in making informed health decisions by advancing the quality and rele-
vance of evidence . . . with respect to the relative health outcomes, clinical
effectiveness, and appropriateness” of medical interventions.205 Comparative
effectiveness research certainly addresses a major gap in our medical-device
and drug research and approval process as well as the generally thin evidence
base for so much of the practice of medicine.206 The research findings of the
Institute may be used in coverage determinations by the Secretary of HHS but
with significant limitations, including one directly related to disability status.
Section 6301 provides: “The Secretary shall not use evidence or findings . . . in
a manner that treats extending the life of an elderly, disabled, or terminally ill
individual as of lower value than extending the life of an individual who is
younger, nondisabled, or not terminally ill.”207 Evidence can be used however
to compare the effectiveness of alternative treatments in extending life due to
age, disability, or terminal illness.208
The bigger limitation written into the ACA with regard to a real cost com-
parison of different health care treatments, in Section 6301, is a prohibition on
cost-effectiveness calculations. The language of the ACA bars use of a “dol-
lars-per-quality adjusted life year (or similar measure that discounts the value
of a life because of an individual’s disability) as a threshold to establish what
type of health care is cost effective or recommended . . . [or to] determine
coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs.”209
This provision appears to explicitly block study of a treatment’s cost-
effectiveness. This contrasts with the mandate of United Kingdom’s National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), which has a positive inter-
national reputation for the development of clinical guidelines. NICE makes an
203 See Patient-Centered Outcomes Research, PCORI, http://www.pcori.org/research-we-
support/pcor/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).
204 See Funding Opportunities, PCORI, http://www.pcori.org/funding-opportunities/ (last
visited Apr. 9, 2013); National Priorities for Research and Research Agenda, PCORI, http://
www.pcori.org/research-we-support/priorities-agenda (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).
205 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301, 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(c) (2012).
206 For a robust criticism of comparative effectiveness research as developed in the ACA,
see generally Richard S. Saver, Health Care Reform’s Wild Card: The Uncertain Effective-
ness of Comparative Effectiveness Research, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2147 (2011) (arguing that
the ACA is likely to be ineffective in producing a change in physician practice); M. Gregg
Bloche, Beyond the “R Word”?: Medicine’s New Frugality, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1951,
1951 (2012) (Gregg Bloche also observes that “high-quality studies of clinical effectiveness
can cost tens of millions of dollars and take many years; they’re unlikely to identify much of
the wasted 30% in the near term.”); Howard Brody, From an Ethics of Rationing to an
Ethics of Waste Avoidance, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1949 (2012).
207 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301, 42 U.S.C. § 1320e-1(c)(1).
208 For a range of treatments of the cost issue, see Symposium, Cost and End-of-Life Care,
39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 111 (2011).
209 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301, 42 U.S.C. § 1320e-1(e).
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explicit determination of cost-benefit boundaries for medical technologies
assessed.210 One commentator states that NICE is “the closest anyone has yet
come to fulfilling the economist’s dream of how priority-setting in health care
should be conducted. It is transparent, evidence-based, seeks to balance effi-
ciency with equity, and uses a cost-per-QALY benchmark as the focus for its
decision-making.”211 Such an approach has empirical and political dimensions
of course, but as the approach matures, it is a necessary approach to evaluating
the merits of new technologies.212
2. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation
The CMS Innovation Center is a second institutional creation of the
ACA.213 This Center will test different health care delivery and payment mod-
els to evaluate their effect on quality of care and cost of services.214 It provides
additional funding to the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality to study
health care delivery systems with a focus on quality improvement, patient
safety, and best practices.215 The HHS Secretary is charged with selecting mod-
els that not only reduce costs and enhance the quality of care but also improve
“the coordination, quality, and efficiency of health care services.”216
3. Demonstration Projects and Other Reforms
The ACA establishes a posture of continuous, data-driven testing of the
performance of health care professionals and facilities. The ACA also launches
“demonstration projects” through which the federal government funds particu-
lar forms of health care or health care delivery systems with a requirement that
their performance be studied to assess their potential for wider adoption.217
210 MICHAEL SCHLANDER, HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTS BY THE NATIONAL INSTI-
TUTE FOR HEALTH AND CLINICAL EXCELLENCE: A QUALITATIVE STUDY 3–5 (2007).
211 Alan Williams, Office of Health Economics Annual Lecture: What Could Be Nicer Than
NICE? 3 (2004). A quality-adjusted life year (QALY) is a measure of quality that adjusts a
year of life based on its quality or value. A year in perfect health equals 1.0 QALY. Less
than perfect health would then be discounted to varying degrees. See, e.g., Definition of
QALY, MEDICINENET.COM, http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=7924
(last visited Apr. 9, 2013).
212 See SCHLANDER, supra note 210, at 173–86 (looking at fairness and political dimensions
of NICE assessments).
213 See Welcome to the CMS Innovation Center, CENTER FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SER-
VICES, www.innovations.cms.gov (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).
214 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(a)(1).
215 Id. § 3501(b), 42 U.S.C. § 299b-33(b).
216 Id. § 3021(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(a)(1).
217 The ACA has five pilot projects and thirty demonstration projects. Pilot initiatives
include, for example: National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling, id. § 3023(a)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 1395cc-4 (2010); Healthy Aging, Living Well, id. § 4202(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300u-
14(a) (2010); Demonstration Project Concerning Individualized Wellness Plan, id. § 4206,
42 U.S.C. § 254b(s) (2010); and Pilot Testing Pay-for-Performance Programs for Certain
Medicare Providers, id. § 10326, 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-1 note (2012). Demonstration projects
include: Demonstration Project to Evaluate Integrated Care Around a Hospitalization, id.
§ 2704, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a note (2012); Medicaid Global Payment System Demonstration
Project, id. § 2705, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a note (2012); Pediatric Accountable Care Organization
Demonstration Project, id. § 2706, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a note (2012); Independence at Home
Demonstration Program, id. § 3024, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-5 (2010); and Medicare Hospice
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It should be noted that with or without the ACA’s mandates, medical soci-
eties have begun to unite to develop standards to reduce unnecessary testing
and procedures. Medical societies have taken on responsibility for reducing
unnecessary medical care through their Choosing Wisely campaign.218
4. Fraud and Abuse Expansions
Finally, the ACA has added robust new tools to fight fraud and abuse
activities. Title VI of the ACA, entitled “Transparency and Program Integrity,”
improves detection and prevention of provider fraud involving the Medicare,
Medicaid, and SCHP programs.219 Provisions are aimed at preventing fraud
perpetrated by small equipment providers and service providers or suppliers,
typically enrolled with little oversight, who quickly receive payments for ser-
vices not provided and then disappear before the authorities can locate them.220
The ACA includes new and strengthened penalties, tightened legal standards,
and steps to enhance State anti-fraud efforts. Provisions increase screening and
oversight of new providers, improve information sharing, and mandate greater
transparency.221
C. Advance System Reform: Promoting Innovation and Value
Cost containment is a “public good”: a large part of society benefits from its success,
but no one really wants the misery of having to do it. The problem for public policy,
then, is to create organizational structures in which those responsible for exerting
compressive forces not only have the ability and motivation to do the task but cannot
escape it.222
Concurrent Care Demonstration Program, id. § 3140, 42 U.S.C. § 1395d note (2012). Con-
gress addressed demonstration projects throughout the Act. See, e.g., id. §§ 2601, 2704,
2705, 2706, 3126, 4206, and so on and on.
218 Christine K. Cassel & James A. Guest, Choosing Wisely: Helping Physicians and
Patients Make Smart Decisions About Their Care, 307 JAMA 1801, 1801 (2012) (“To help
reduce waste in the US health care system and promote physician and patient conversations
about making wise choices about treatments, 9 medical specialty societies have joined the
ABIM (American Board of Internal Medicine) Foundation and Consumer Reports in the first
phase of the Choosing Wisely campaign, including the following: American Academy of
Allergy, Asthma & Immunology; American Academy of Family Physicians; American Col-
lege of Cardiology; American College of Physicians; American College of Radiology;
American Gastroenterological Association; American Society of Clinical Oncology; Ameri-
can Society of Nephrology; and the American Society of Nuclear Cardiology.”). See also
The Good Stewardship Working Grp., The “Top 5” Lists in Primary Care: Meeting the
Responsibility of Professionalism, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1385, 1385 (2011), avail-
able at http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1105881.
219 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6001, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2010).
220 Too many Medicare providers are scam artists, some with connections to organized
crime, that have skillfully capitalized on the holes in the government’s payment process. See,
e.g., 60 Minutes: Medicare Fraud Is Costing Us Millions of Dollars! (CBS television broad-
cast Oct. 25, 2009), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GUY_01n1XWQ.
221 See Newsroom, New Tools to Fight Fraud, Strengthen Federal and Private Health Pro-
grams, and Protect Consumer and Taxpayer Dollars, HEALTHCARE.GOV (Oct. 9, 2012),
http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/03/fraud03152011a.html. See also John K.
Iglehart, Finding Money for Health Care Reform—Rooting Out Waste, Fraud, and Abuse,
361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229, 229–31 (2009).
222 Evans, supra note 122, at 122.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-3\NVJ308.txt unknown Seq: 35 17-JUN-13 10:35
856 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:822
Services and products can drop in price over time at least outside the
health care industry, as the cost of a laptop computer, a long-distance phone
call, or a commercial flight illustrate. James Robinson notes three domains
where costs have dropped: drugs and devices such as generics and diagnostic
tests; improved processes that allow health care professionals with less training
to provide care at lower cost; and care sites that provide simple but adequate
care, such as ambulatory centers and retail clinics.223 He notes the value of
disruptive innovation and the regulatory and reimbursement barriers that slow
innovation in delivery-system models.224 The ACA has offered up a range of
possibilities such as accountable care organizations and other models that may
speed innovation and reorganize health care.
1. Reorganize: New Organizational Models
Innovations in medicine include reorganizing care delivery. A recent study
of knee-replacement surgery found substantial variations across the studied
organizations in “surgery times, hospital lengths-of-stay, discharge disposi-
tions, and in-hospital complication rates.”225
The study also revealed that higher surgeon caseloads were associated with shorter
lengths-of-stay and operating time, as well as fewer in-hospital complications. These
findings led the consortium to test more coordinated management for medically com-
plex patients, more use of dedicated teams, and a process to improve the management
of patients’ expectations. These innovations are now being tried by the consortium’s
members to evaluate whether they increase health care value.226
Much study is needed to figure how to model care delivery for best value.
The push toward new delivery forms marks the core of the ACA and its
coordination reforms. Section 3021 of the ACA provides a number of possible
coordination reforms. These innovative payment and delivery arrangements
include the promotion of various models of integration that reduce or eliminate
fee-for-service payment systems; for example, patient-centered medical home
models and other models “transition primary care practices away from fee-for-
service based reimbursement and toward comprehensive payment or salary-
based payment.”227 Other models include direct contracting with groups of
providers to promote new delivery models “through risk-based comprehensive
payment or salary-based payment”228 and coordinated-care models that “transi-
tion health care providers away from fee-for-service based reimbursement and
toward salary-based payment.”229 A particularly intriguing model explicitly
223 James C. Robinson & Mark D. Smith, Cost-Reducing Innovation in Health Care, 27
HEATH AFF. 1353, 1353–54 (2008).
224 Id. at 1354–56.
225 Ivan M. Tomek et al., Innovation Profile: A Collaborative of Leading Health Systems
Finds Wide Variations in Total Knee Replacement Delivery and Takes Steps to Improve
Value, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1329, 1329 (2012), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/con-
tent/early/2012/04/30/hlthaff.2011.0935.full.html.
226 Id.
227 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(b)(2)(B)(i)
(2010).
228 Id. § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(b)(2)(B)(ii).
229 Id. § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(b)(2)(B)(iv).
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allows for testing of “all-payer payment reform for the medical care of
residents of the State[s].”230
Accountable care organizations (ACOs) are “groups of providers of ser-
vices and suppliers . . . [who] work together to manage and coordinate care for
Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries . . . .”231 “[A] collection of primary care
physicians, specialists, and potentially other health professionals [(including
hospitals) will] accept joint responsibility for the quality and cost of care pro-
vided to its patients.”232 “If the ACO meets certain targets, its members receive
a financial bonus.”233 The assumption is that groups of providers—“collec-
tively accountable for meeting cost and quality targets, internal peer review and
peer pressure”—will be motivated to identify and implement best practices,
resulting in better cost controls and outcomes.234 ACOs will most likely
operate as mini-health plans, building the infrastructure to manage utilization and
insure [sic] quality-care delivery. To establish targets, cost trends, and provider pay-
ment and incentive distribution models, ACOs will require sophisticated financial
and actuarial analyses. To control demand and improve the quality of care delivery,
ACOs will need to have the tools, processes, and reporting for chronic-disease man-
agement, complex case management, and wellness/prevention services. To control
medically unnecessary services, ACOs will need to have the tools, processes, and
reporting for preauthorization, hospital utilization review, high-tech radiology man-
agement, specialty referral management, and pharmacy management.235
230 Id. § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(b)(2)(B)(xi).
231 Id. § 3022, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)(A). See generally Elliott S. Fisher et al., Creating
Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended Hospital Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH AFF.
w44, w51–w53 (2007), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/1/w44.full.pdf+html
(arguing for the use of ACOs at the level of “extended hospital medical staff” as a way to
better coordinate patient care); see also Stephen M. Shortell & Lawrence P. Casalino, Health
Care Reform Requires Accountable Care Systems, 300 JAMA 95, 97 (2008) (discussing the
potential for ACOs to “be designed to create value by improving . . . patient outcomes”
while simultaneously reducing costs). Much of the formative work of ACOs can be traced to
the Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice headed by Dr. Elliott Fisher
and Dr. James Weinstein. See, e.g., Elliott S. Fisher et al., Fostering Accountable Health
Care: Moving Forward in Medicare, 28 HEALTH AFF. w219, w222, w227 (2009), http://
content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/2/w219.full.pdf (proposing Medicare-payment reform
through ACOs); see also DARTMOUTH INST., ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATION LEARNING
NETWORK TOOLKIT 4 (2011) (providing resources on ACOs).
232 Barry R. Furrow, Patient Safety in American Health Care: Regulatory Models, in
PATIENT SAFETY, LAW POLICY AND PRACTICE 210, 219 (John Tingle & Pippa Bark eds.,
2011) [hereinafter Furrow, Patient Safety in American Health Care]. See also Thomas L.
Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations—The Fork in the Road, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED.
e1(1), e1(1)–(2) (2011) (discussing the benefits and concerns surrounding the implementa-
tion of ACO reform measures).
233 Furrow, Patient Safety in American Health Care, supra note 232, at 219. See Mark
McClellan et al., A National Strategy to Put Accountable Care into Practice, 29 HEALTH
AFF. 982, 983 (2010) (discussing different ACO payment models). See also James C. Robin-
son et al., The Alignment and Blending of Payment Incentives Within Physician Organiza-
tions, 39 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1589, 1604 (2004).
234 Furrow, Patient Safety in American Health Care, supra note 232, at 219. See Stephen
M. Shortell et al., How the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation Should Test
Accountable Care Organizations, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1293, 1294 (2010) (increased coordina-
tion among clinical teams will induce better coordination).
235 Robert Parke & Kate Fitch, Accountable Care Organizations: The New Provider
Model?, INSIGHT (Oct. 13, 2009), http://insight.milliman.com/article.php?cntid=6056. See
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Patient-Centered Medical Homes (PCMH) are another new model to
improve primary care.236
A patient in a PCMH works closely with a specific [primary care doctor] and sup-
porting clinical staff over time [with the care team orchestrating] the patient’s medi-
cal care, either by providing care directly or by referring the patient for specialty
care. Patients receive timely access through expanded office hours and multiple path-
ways to medical assistance. Quality and safety are enhanced through information
technology and practice redesign.237
Health Care Innovation Zones are another idea to force integrated care.
Because centers such as the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation can
channel millions of dollars toward research and expansion of payment and
delivery reforms, their output is likely to be influential on the future of medical
practice. Subsection 3021(a) aims to create such zones, comprised of “groups
of providers that include a teaching hospital, physicians, and other clinical enti-
ties, that, . . . [can] deliver a full spectrum of integrated and comprehensive
health care services to applicable individuals.”238 ACOs, PCMHs, and other
coordination models fostered by current federal policy offer a model of better
and more efficient care.239 ACOs are already underway in both the public and
private sectors. Medicare has announced more than 250 ACO contracts,240 and
private ACOs are developing; Leavitt Partners reports that 324 ACOs are being
structured in forty-five states and the District of Columbia.241 ACOs are being
developed in many states for Medicaid populations.242 However, “most of the
activity is being driven by the private sector . . . . The interest is driven not only
by theory but also by early evidence that this model seems to improve quality
MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: IMPROVING INCEN-
TIVES IN THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 56 (2009), available at http://www.medpac.gov/docu-
ments/Jun09_EntireReport.pdf (developing an ACO model as a recommendation for
reforming Medicare’s health care delivery system).
236 Ann M. Mirabito & Leonard L. Berry, Lessons That Patient-Centered Medical Homes
Can Learn from the Mistakes of HMOs, 152 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 182, 182 (2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2064823.
237 Id.
238 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(b)(2)(B)(xviii)
(Supp. IV 2010).
239 See Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety, supra note 19, at 1758–65 (discussing other
coordination models including bundling and medical homes).
240 See Jay Greene, Tracking the ACO Remedy, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Feb. 11, 2013,
10:23 AM), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20130210/NEWS/302109992/tracking-the-
aco-remedy-execs-say-early-reports-show-savings-improved-patient-care; see also Program
News and Announcements, CMS (Jan. 11, 2013, 10:14 AM), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/
Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/News.html (announcing 106 new
ACOs selected for January 1, 2013 Shared Savings Program; this number is on top of 87
selected for a July 1, 2012 start date, and 27 selected for an April 1, 2012 start date).
241 Natalie Gochnour, Leavitt Partners and KLAS Research Release Comprehensive Report
on Accountable Care Organizations, PR NEWSWIRE (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.prnew-
swire.com/news-releases/leavitt-partners-and-klas-research-release-comprehensive-report-
on-accountable-care-organizations-181468431.html; see also DAVID MUHLESTEIN ET AL.,
CTR. FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE INTELLIGENCE, GROWTH AND DISPERSION OF ACCOUNTABLE
CARE ORGANIZATIONS 3, 10 & tbl.1 (Leavitt Partners, 2012).
242 TRICIA MCGINNIS & DAVID MARC SMALL, CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES,
ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS IN MEDICAID: EMERGING PRACTICES TO GUIDE PRO-
GRAM DESIGN (2012), http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/Creating_ACOs_in_Medicaid.pdf.
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and slow cost growth.”243 ACOs and other organizational ideas have gained
traction with the ACA’s incentives for shared savings for providers in such
organizations. Such organizations reduce fragmentation and promote coordina-
tion and integration. As such, it is easier for payers to negotiate over price with
more integrated health care organizations.244
ACOs present a risk of cost inflation, however, in some markets. They
may foster provider consolidation, creating too much market power by provid-
ers against insurers. According to Thomas Greaney, “the ACO phenomenon
may well encourage some mergers, joint ventures, and alliances that will exac-
erbate” the market concentration problem.245 Economic evidence has shown
“that hospital consolidation in the 1990s raised overall inpatient prices by at
least 5%, and by 40% or more when merging hospitals were located close to
one another.”246 Dominant providers can use their market power to seek higher
reimbursements, as well as to deny employers and health plans the ability “to
obtain and use cost and quality data [to] enable them to shop more
effectively.”247
2. Inform: Health Information Technology
The use of health information technology (“HIT”) tools are at the center of
most of these coordination strategies since they assume adoption and utilization
of such tools, “whether for practice management, sharing of patient records and
service information across practitioners and sites, or as knowledge management
tools to provide the most current clinical and comparative effectiveness
research findings, clinical care standards and institutional protocols. These HIT
tools promise long-term cost benefits but have high front-end costs.”248
The benefits of electronic health records (EHRs) are many. They include:
(1) quick, accurate, and complete information about patients, available to a pro-
vider before she even sees the patient, so that physicians can spot problems
earlier; (2) easy sharing of information among doctors, hospitals and systems,
243 Elliott S. Fisher, Room for Debate: The Court Can’t End the Pressure for Reform, N.Y.
TIMES (June 17, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/06/17/what-
will-change-after-the-supreme-courts-health-care-ruling/whatever-the-health-care-ruling-a-
need-for-changes.
244 Evans, supra note 122, at 122–23 (observing that “the policy objectives of providers are
best served by an environment in which no organization has effective responsibility for or
control over total costs, but in which funds flow through numerous and complex channels
and the opportunities for shifting are legion. This creates a form of prisoner’s dilemma for
payers. The optimal individual strategy is to spend one’s energy on efforts to shift costs,
thereby increasing them in total, because individual efforts to constrain the total have almost
no chance of being effective. It is hard to imagine a more satisfactory environment for
providers.”).
245 Greaney, supra note 232, at e1(2).
246 Id. (citing C. H. Williams et al., How Has Hospital Consolidation Affected the Price and
Quality of Hospital Care?, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (2006), http://www.rwjf.org/en/
research-publications/find-rwjf-research/2006/02/how-has-hospital-consolidation-affected-
the-price-and-quality-of.html).
247 Id.
248 Edward Berger, Four Ways to Control Healthcare Spending, MASS DEVICE (Sept. 9,
2010), http://www.massdevice.com/blogs/edward-berger/four-ways-control-healthcare-
spending?page=show.
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allowing for better coordination and care; (3) patient engagement in their care,
allowing patients and their families to view and share health information.
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
(HITECH) Act enables HHS to establish new programs to promote health IT,
including electronic health records (EHRs) and health information exchanges
(HIEs).249 The HITECH Act creates substantial incentive payments for hospi-
tals and eligible health professionals when they adopt certified EHR technology
and then use it to meet specific goals.250
HITECH also provides federal grants to the states to establish statewide
health information exchanges (HIEs). These health information exchanges are
intended to amplify the gains in quality and efficiency that are expected gener-
ally from electronic medical records. In its most basic form an HIE allows
clinicians treating a patient to access necessary patient records—including lab
test results, allergies, diagnoses made by others treating the patient, and so
on—through a one-stop portal rather than by contacting each of the patient’s
health care providers individually. With a master patient index that gives each
patient and each provider a unique identifier, the HIE consolidates patient
health information from the patient’s many health care providers into one vir-
tual record.
3. Pay: Value-Based Reimbursement251
The goal of pay-for-performance (“P4P”) is to try to use outcome mea-
sures tied to pay to begin the process of moving from payment per procedure to
true outcome-driven health care. The federal government has been incre-
mentally building such approaches into Medicare reimbursement since before
the ACA was passed. The early steps in P4P often seem oversimplified and
easier to conceptualize than to implement.252 The ACA builds on health eco-
nomic ideas about how to transform physicians’ economic incentives. The fee-
for-service system is inherently inflationary, rewarding increases in volume of
services without regard to patient value or outcome measures. Other payment
models, such as paying physicians a base salary with additional incentives
based on quality, are likely to produce better patient results at the same or
249 See Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 226 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
250 Policymaking, Regulation, & Strategy, Meaningful Use, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.
healthit.gov/policy-researchers-implementers/meaningful-use (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
251 See generally Arnold M. Epstein, Thomas H. Lee & Mary Beth Hamel, Paying
Physicians for High-Quality Care, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 406 (2004).
252 Bruce C. Vladeck, Letters, Ineffective Approach, 23 HEALTH AFF. 285, 285–86 (2004).
Vladeck, former Administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration (predecessor
agency to CMS), finds little to support in P4P, which he describes as “the kind of seductive
focus group-tested catch phrase that . . . is largely devoid of real content.” Id. at 285. He
writes:
Is the increasing commodification of health care, especially as embodied in “pay for perform-
ance” schemes, consistent with a thoughtful, long-term strategy to maximize quality? A compre-
hensive quality improvement strategy needs to focus on reinforcing the norms and values of
professional responsibility, rather than on undermining them through the exercise of economic
muscle.
Id. at 286.
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lower cost. The ACA promotes experimentation by providers with modes of
payment, which might include forms of capitation payments of a fixed amount
for a defined bundle of services, with some practitioner risk factors for costs in
excess of the capitation amount.253 In the 1970s, health maintenance organiza-
tions promised efficient lower cost care.254 Unfortunately, the excesses of some
managed care plans led to the discrediting of capitation and risk-sharing. Cur-
rent ACO models under the ACA offer a “kinder and gentler” version.255 CMS
has already implemented bundled payment for chronic end-stage renal disease
services.256 Such a disease-management model offers quality improvement
coupled with reasonable return to providers. Global payments, being tried in
Massachusetts at the state level, also shift incentives away from fee-for-service
toward managing units of care.257 Kenneth Kaufman writes:
As U.S. healthcare begins to move from an activity-based business model that
incentivizes utilization of services to a value-based model that incentivizes popula-
tion health management across the continuum of care, thousands of healthcare “sci-
ence projects” are taking place in communities nationwide. Data emerging from the
early initiatives by organizations that are aggressively transforming care delivery and
payment should identify whether a “premium” of curve-bending change is occurring
through these value-based efforts.258
Value is very hard to measure in our fragmented, non-electronic delivery
system, and most providers fail to measure value.259 Porter argues that
[c]osts, like outcomes, should instead be measured around the patient. Measuring the
total costs over a patient’s entire care cycle and weighing them against outcomes will
enable truly structural cost reduction, through steps such as reallocation of spending
among types of services, elimination of non–value-adding services, better use of
capacity, shortening of cycle time, provision of services in the appropriate settings,
and so on.260
253 Berger, supra note 248; see also James C. Robinson, Theory and Practice in the Design
of Physician Payment Incentives, 79 MILBANK Q. 149, 149 (2001) (“There are many mecha-
nisms for paying physicians; some are good and some are bad. The three worst are fee-for-
service, capitation, and salary. Fee-for-service rewards the provision of inappropriate ser-
vices, the fraudulent upcoding of visits and procedures, and the churning of ‘ping-pong’
referrals among specialists. Capitation rewards the denial of appropriate services, the dump-
ing of the chronically ill, and a narrow scope of practice that refers out every time-consum-
ing patient. Salary undermines productivity, condones on-the-job leisure, and fosters a
bureaucratic mentality in which every procedure is someone else’s problem.”).
254 Mirabito & Berry, supra note 236, at 182. For a discussion of the full range of tools used
by managed care plans in the 1980s and into the 1990s, see generally Barry R. Furrow,
Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury: Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REV. 419,
433–42 (1997).
255 Berger, supra note 248.
256 See ESRD Payment, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (Mar. 23, 2012,
1:17 PM), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-payment/ESRDpay-
ment/index.html?redirect=/ESRDPayment/.
257 Robert Steinbrook, The End of Fee-for-Service Medicine?: Proposals for Payment
Reform in Massachusetts, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1036, 1036 (2009).
258 Kaufman, supra note 12.
259 Michael E. Porter, What Is Value in Health Care?, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2477, 2478
(2010).
260 Id. at 2481.
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Such a patient-centered valuation model, using electronic health records
and close tracking of costs, will certainly promote more efficient care. The
pressures of the ACA and new requirements for electronic health records
(EHRs) are pushing hospitals rapidly toward new ways of thinking about treat-
ment value.
Labor Productivity Improvements. Our health care system is very labor
intensive, with very few productivity improvements over the past twenty years.
We spent $2.6 trillion in 2010 on health care, of which fifty-six percent was
wages for health care workers.261 Kocher and Sahni note that “[t]he combina-
tion of a risk-based payment model tied to outcome goals, on the one hand, and
coding rules that are appropriate regardless of how providers achieve their
clinical goals, on the other, could inspire the implementation of innovative,
technology-based, analytically informed approaches that increase productiv-
ity.”262 Only weak incentives exist to improve labor productivity. As Kocher
and Sahni write:
If the health care sector is to achieve even the average improvement in labor produc-
tivity seen in the overall U.S. economy, we will need to redesign the care delivery
model much more fundamentally to use a different quantity and mix of workers
engaging in a much higher value set of activities.263
Productivity-enhancing ideas include using lower-level providers (such as
nurses in place of physicians when appropriate), using more technology and
teams, standardizing far more processes, and using evidence-based medicine all
the time to reduce complications and side effects.
Enthusiasm for health care cost-control ideas often outruns what works.
The mantra of innovation, often touted by economics and business academics,
promises rapid change that delivers better care at lower cost, but innovation in
health care is often stymied by payment rules, inertia, and fear of the disruption
inherent in large-scale change. Nor will innovation always be cheaper—by
delivering care at lower cost through efficiency techniques, it will spread such
care to more people, raising health care expenditures as a percentage of GDP.
D. Maximize Competition: Insurance Exchanges, Websites, and Other
Market Reforms
Consumers have faced incentives for cost reduction for decades. Since the
growth of managed care, consumers have had to pay co-payments and deduct-
ibles as features of their health insurance coverage, on the theory that some
discretionary health care use would be reduced.264 The movement in the ACA
toward information transparency is evidence in the insurance exchange con-
cept, which aims to make insurance products in the individual market transpar-
ent as to coverage and price.265 The federal government’s move toward quality
information on websites such as Physician Compare and Hospital Compare is
261 Robert Kocher & Nikhil R. Sahni, Rethinking Health Care Labor, 365 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1370, 1370 (2011).
262 Id. at 1372.
263 Id. at 1371.
264 See, e.g., GINSBURG, supra note 72, at 20–21.
265 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Insurance Exchanges and the Affordable Care Act: Key
Policy Issues, COMMONWEALTH FUND, at 15 (2010), available at http://www.commonwealth
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another example of enabling consumers to shop.266 In theory, consumers can
choose lower cost providers if prices can ever be posted in a transparent way.
Research on effectiveness and provider willingness to calculate and post prices
are required to make such shopping workable for consumers.
1. Insurance Market Reforms
Insurance reform is a major reform of the ACA. By 2014, the ACA will
have driven a substantial expansion of Medicaid, implemented premium tax
credits to make private plans purchased through new state insurance exchanges
affordable, and implemented new insurance market rules to make private insur-
ance coverage more affordable for individuals, families and small businesses.
All individuals (with some exceptions) will have to obtain insurance coverage
through employers, public programs, the individual market, or the health insur-
ance exchanges for the individual and small group markets.267
The ACA provisions aim to stimulate market competition among health
plans, incentivizing them to offer affordable, value-based options through the
new insurance exchanges.268 The health insurance exchange is a consumer-
friendly market for health insurance, resembling a farmer’s market, stock mar-
ket, or online travel service. It will be a place where consumers can go, browse
through the range of available insurance options, and choose the best insurance
plan for themselves and their families. Small-business health options (“SHOP”)
exchanges will offer the same opportunities to small businesses.269 The expec-
tation is that insurers will be driven to present understandable and transparent
information so consumers can shop well, making intelligent choices.
These exchanges will provide consumers choices among pre-approved
health plans that are easier to choose among.270 Qualified health plans (QHPs)
will be the only plans allowed on the exchanges, and the “ACA also requires
two QHPs participating in each exchange to be multi-state plans or MSPs.”271
fund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2010/Jul/1426_Jost_hlt_insurance_
exchanges_ACA.pdf.
266 See, e.g., Mary Ellen Schneider, Medicare Launches Physician Compare Website, AM.
C. SURGEONS (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.facs.org/surgerynews/2011/compare0111.html; see
also Hospital Compare, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/?Aspx
AutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
267 Jane Hyatt Thorpe, Trish Riley & Teresa Cascio, Multi-State Health Plans, HEALTH
REFORM GPS (June 7, 2012), http://healthreformgps.org/resources/multi-state-health-plans/.
268 Id.
269 Affordable Insurance Exchanges: Choices, Competition and Clout for Small Businesses,
HEALTHCARE.GOV (July 11, 2011), http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/07/
exchanges07112011c.html.
270 Thorpe, Riley & Cascio, supra note 267. By 2014, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA) will provide expanded health insurance coverage through three major fea-
tures: (1) “a substantial expansion in Medicaid,” (2) premium tax credits to make more
“affordable private plans purchased through new state insurance exchanges,” and (3) insur-
ance market reforms to “make private coverage more accessible to individuals and families
as well as small businesses.” All individuals, with some exceptions, “will be required to
obtain insurance coverage through employers, public programs, the individual market, or the
health insurance exchanges for the individual and small group markets.” These reforms are
access-enhancing. The ACA’s market competition to control costs should be noted, however.
Id.
271 Id.
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These MSPs may provide the foundation for a national approach in which state
plans are uniform and portable, enabling consumers to move without having to
shop again for insurance.272 It is this combination of uniformity and portability
that promises to provide consistency in health coverage, giving consumers
greater ability to shop and resulting in cost savings as the fragmentation of the
old system is replaced by a simpler, fairer system. Costs should drop as a result.
2. Consumer Shopping Tools
The ACA reflects the growth of a consumerist movement in health, giving
patients information about health care risks and costs to maximize their choice.
Kristin Madison defines consumerism as “individual choice within a health
care marketplace characterized by the exchange of money for health care goods
or services.”273 The consumer relies on information from many different
sources, particularly websites. This consumerist approach moves us from a pas-
sive patient to an aggressive shopper trying to gain information to satisfy her
preferences for treatments, risks, and costs. Sources of information includes
web-based sites such as WebMD, health care report cards issued by private and
public organizations, and, with the force of the ACA, a range of government-
run websites: Physician Compare and Hospital Compare.274 Infection compari-
sons among hospitals have been added to the shopping list.275
Consumerism has limits. It turns patients into consumers and health care
into a business, risking a more predatory “buyer beware” world. We see this
with the use of social media to post complaints about doctors, using Angie’s
List or other websites to post hostile comments with a counterattack by compa-
272 Id.
273 Kristin Madison, Patients as “Regulators”?: Patients’ Evolving Influence over Health
Care Delivery, 31 J. LEGAL MED. 9, 15 (2010), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/abs/10.1080/01947641003598195.
274 See, e.g., Hospital Compare, supra note 266 (this government-run site already allows
consumers to compare hospital choices).
275 Id. (Medicare is reporting three sets of patient safety measures on the Hospital Compare
website: Serious Complications, Hospital-Acquired Conditions, Healthcare-Associated
Infections).
The Serious Complications and Deaths measures, developed by the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ), provide information about how likely it is that patients will
suffer from complications and deaths while in the hospital. Some of these complications and
deaths might have been prevented if the hospital followed procedures based on best practices and
scientific evidence.
The Hospital Acquired Conditions measures show how often patients got certain serious
conditions while in the hospital, that might have been prevented if the hospital followed proce-
dures based on best practices and scientific evidence.
The Healthcare Associated Infection measures are developed by Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC) and collected through the National Healthcare Safety Network. They
provide information on infections that occur while the patient is in the hospital. These infections
can be related to devices, such as central lines and urinary catheters, or spread from patient to
patient after contact with an infected person or surface. Many healthcare associated infections
can be prevented when the hospitals use CDC-recommended infection control steps.
Quality Definitions and Methodology: Patient Safety Measures, AM. HOSP. DIRECTORY
(Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.ahd.com/definitions/qual_acq_cond.html; see also Measures of
Readmissions, Complications and Deaths, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/Hospi-
talCompare/Data/RCD/Overview.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
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nies that offer doctors a retaliatory option.276 Treating physicians began to treat
patients as potentially threatening consumers, turning a professional relation-
ship into a business contract. The bigger problem with consumerism is that it is
doomed to failure at many levels. It assumes that most patients have the ability
to be active consumers.277 The fault in this assumption is that often the time
when patients are most likely to engage the health care system is when they are
ill, dependent, and weak. Shopping is the last thing on their minds.
There is room for improved shopping in the U.S. system in spite of the
problems noted above. Shopping for quality services in advance, thinking about
provider choices before getting sick, and selecting the right insurance policy is
all part of a rational approach to consumer shopping in health care.
Enabling consumers to shop for quality is a significant policy goal of the
ACA. Section 3015 provides for performance websites, which are to:
make available to the public . . . performance information summarizing data on qual-
ity measures. Such information shall be tailored to respond to the differing needs of
hospitals and other institutional health care providers, physicians and other clinicians,
patients, consumers, researchers, policymakers, States, and other stakeholders, as the
Secretary may specify.278
Websites now in existence include Hospital Compare, Physician Compare,
and Nursing Home Compare.279 These websites require a range of perform-
ance-based information including patient clinical conditions and provider infor-
mation.280 Such public posting of provider performance information assumes
that consumers will use these websites to facilitate making choices among
providers.281 More important, perhaps, is that providers will work harder to
achieve high-quality care to avoid being shamed by bad ratings.
E. Promote Moderation: From Wellness to Dying Well
When thinking about life and death moved from the library to the laboratory, the
light of history dimmed. The future trumped the past. Youth vanquished age, and
death grew unthinkable. The more secular ideas about immortality have become, the
less well anyone, including and maybe especially doctors and scientists, has accepted
dying, or even growing old.282
If an individual promotes his own wellness through exercise, diet, and
good health habits, his long-term health is likely to improve. An obvious strat-
egy is to improve individual health to reduce long-term social costs. One of the
features of the insurance reforms in the ACA is to focus on individual health
276 See Making Healthcare Safe for Doctors, MED. JUST., http://www.medicaljustice.com
(last visited Apr. 10, 2013). Its slogan is “Relentlessly protecting physicians from frivolous
lawsuits.” They offer to deter frivolous malpractice claims, address unwarranted demands
for refunds, and protect doctors’ reputations online.
277 See Paul Krugman, Patients Are Not Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2011, at A23.
278 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3015, 42 U.S.C. § 280j-2 (2012).
279 See, e.g., Hospital Compare, supra note 266; Physician Compare, MEDICARE.GOV,
http://www.medicare.gov/find-a-doctor/provider-search.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2013);
Nursing Home Compare, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/NursingHomeCompare/
(last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
280 Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety, supra note 19, at 1750.
281 For information on the critiques of website information, see id.
282 JILL LEPORE, THE MANSION OF HAPPINESS: A HISTORY OF LIFE AND DEATH xii (2012).
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coupled with a concept of a “fair share” in health care—costs according to an
individual’s ability to pay rather than on the volume of services consumed and
individual choices more than genetic or preexisting health risks.283 The ACA
fosters wellness and prevention programs by eliminating cost sharing for pre-
ventive health services.284 This focus on wellness and prevention promotes
individual responsibility and moderation as a cost-conserving strategy. It is
hardly unique to the ACA, but simply recognizes what is already happening in
the workplace: private employers and insurers are designing programs with
incentives for individual subscribers to be healthy.285
Will such programs make much of a difference? The evidence is not clear;
the programs are popular with those who think that illness is largely the fault of
individuals with bad health habits, who should have to bear their own health
costs rather than impose such costs on others.286 Advocates claimed, for exam-
ple, that the Safeway Company’s wellness programs287 were a success story of
cost savings, claims that turned out to be largely false.288
A second major feature of health promotion is a range of public health
programs that reduce smoking, use of drugs, driving risks, and other behaviors.
A report released by the Trust for America’s Health in 2008 concluded that a
small investment in disease prevention could result in significant savings in
U.S. health care costs: “[A]n investment of $10 per person per year in proven
community-based programs to increase physical activity, improve nutrition,
and prevent smoking and other tobacco use could save the country more than
$16 billion annually within five years. This is a return of $5.60 for every
$1.”289
283 See Baker, supra note 62, at 11 (partial draft prepared for the University of Pennsylvania
Law School’s health law symposium).
284 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-16(a) (2010); accord 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-17(a)(1)(D)
(2010). Section 2716 of the ACA prohibits discrimination based on salary, and section
2717(a)(1)(D) requires insurers to implement wellness and health promotion activities. See
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 2716–17.
285 Katherine Baicker, David Cutler & Zirui Song, Workplace Wellness Programs Can Gen-
erate Savings, 29 HEALTH AFF. 304, 304 (2010) (finding that “medical costs fall by about
$3.27 for every dollar spent on wellness programs and that absenteeism costs fall by about
$2.73 for every dollar spent.”).
286 See NANCY LEE JONES ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40661, WELLNESS PROGRAMS:
SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 15 (2010), available at http://www.disabilityleavelaw.com/uploads/
file/CRS%20Wellness%20Report(1).pdf; Anita K. Chancey, Getting Healthy: Issues to Con-
sider Before Implementing a Wellness Program, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 73, 73 (2009);
Lucinda Jesson, Weighing the Wellness Programs: The Legal Implications of Imposing Per-
sonal Responsibility Obligations, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 217, 220 (2008).
287 See, e.g., Steven A. Burd, How Safeway Is Cutting Health-Care Costs, WALL ST. J.,
June 12, 2009, at A15. The Safeway idea was to motivate workers to improve their own
health. The focus was on personal responsibility; Safeway concluded that up to seventy
percent of all health-care costs are the result of individual behavior, and that most of these
costs are due to four chronic conditions (cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes and obes-
ity), conditions that are largely preventable.
288 David S. Hilzenrath, A Success Story That Isn’t Shapes Health-Care Debate: Blood
Tests and Weigh-Ins Misleading Claims Drive “Safeway Amendment”, WASH. POST, Jan.
17, 2010, at G1.
289 Prevention for a Healthier America, TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH (July 2008), http://
healthyamericans.org/reports/prevention08/.
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The National Prevention, Health Promotion, and Public Health Council
was created by executive order to coordinate prevention activities across the
federal government to promote the nation’s health.290 To support the expansion
of prevention activities, a new Prevention and Public Health Fund was created
by the ACA with the goal of creating and supporting the needed infrastructure
for prevention, detection and management of conditions before they become
severe.291 This new initiative will increase the national investment in preven-
tion and public health, improve health, and enhance health care quality. This
significant focus on and funding for prevention includes a wide range of initia-
tives, from Community and Clinical Prevention ($126 million) to strengthening
the public health infrastructure at the state and local levels, to more research
and training on public health issues.292 Here regulators need to be careful not to
blame the victim. Take the problem of obesity. It may be the primary health-
damaging disease in the United States and many other countries as well. Well-
ness programs in the workplace may help, as will public education. But one
analyst had argued that the primary cause of obesity is simply an excess of
cheap food, which leads to overconsumption by consumers. Food no longer
takes work to harvest and prepare—between processed foods in the average
supermarket and fast food restaurants in the United States in particular, we are
surrounded by marketed temptation.
The epidemic was caused by the overproduction of food in the United States.
Beginning in the 1970s, there was a change in national agricultural policy.
Instead of the government paying farmers not to engage in full production, as was the
practice, they were encouraged to grow as much food as they could. At the same
time, technological changes and the “green revolution” made our farms much more
productive. The price of food plummeted, while the number of calories available to
the average American grew by about 1,000 a day.293
Our food is too cheap, our portions are too large, and manufacturer pack-
age design and marketing exacerbates the problem, adding another factor lead-
ing to overeating.294 New strategies are needed to reduce our intake. Marketing
290 Affordable Care Act: Laying the Foundation for Prevention, HEALTHREFORM.GOV (Nov.
2, 2012, 1:22 PM), http://www.healthreform.gov/newsroom/acaprevention.html; see also
Exec. Order No. 13,544, 75 Fed. Reg. 33,983 (June 10, 2010), available at http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-establishing-national-prevention-health-promo-
tion-and-public-health (established under the authority of the ACA).
291 Affordable Care Act: Laying the Foundation for Prevention, supra note 290.
292 For a full discussion of the range of public health issues, see Symposium, Public Health
Reform: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Implications for the Public’s Health, 39
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 307 (2011).
293 Claudia Dreifus, A Mathematical Challenge to Obesity, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2012, at
D2 (reporting on a mathematical analysis of obesity by Dr. Carson Chow). For slides of Dr.
Chow’s talk, see Carson C. Chow, Lecture: The Math Behind the Myths of Obesity (Feb. 20,
2012), available at http://sciencehouse.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/aaas122.pdf.
294 Pierre Chandon, How Package Design and Packaged-Based Marketing Claims Lead to
Overeating 12 (INSEAD, Working Paper No. 2012/61/MKT, 2012), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2083618.
[A] promising approach may be to change the choice context at the point of purchase and at the
point of consumption so that the healthy choice becomes the easy choice. Obviously, a combina-
tion of smart regulation, promotion of mindful eating, and mindless nudges is more likely to
work than any of them in isolation.
Id. at 27.
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of food should be regulated more aggressively, especially to children; price
supports for agricultural production should be cut; and we should develop strat-
egies for eating less (e.g., cook more, buy raw ingredients). In other words, it is
not just our fault but, rather, the combined pressures of external forces. The
technologies of modern agriculture and food marketing doom us, and a strong
public-health pushback by regulators is needed to protect us from ourselves and
these forces.
A third perilous area of cost conservation is how to die well and frugally if
we so choose. As Daniel Callahan asks: “Should death be seen as the greatest
evil that medicine should seek to combat, or would a good quality of life within
a finite life span be a better goal?”295 He proposes a change in social expecta-
tions and norms about dying so we learn not to exert every last bit of energy on
health expenditures that promise minimal gains at high prices.296 Here the law
can induce individual reflection on dying well. Use of advance directives is the
best example of a process of such induction. We know that advance directives
do matter.297 One study looked at a population of aged patients, particularly
that segment (about one third) who would become too incapacitated over time
to make needed decisions about end-of-life care.298 The study found that in this
population, “nearly all of those with a living will [who request] limited or com-
fort care only [in fact] did receive such care at the end of their lives. And those
patients who specified all care possible were far more likely to receive aggres-
sive care than those who did not request it.”299 Advance directives work,
allowing precise instructions to care givers. Managing the end of life with such
directives may have cost-conserving effects by reducing low-benefit, high-cost
scrambling at the end of life when the patient is incompetent and family is
conflicted or absent.
The ACA avoided the perils of advance directives and “death panels,” the
rhetorically felicitous phrase coined by Sarah Palin and her handlers.300 But the
ACA does promote decision aids as a tool to improve the informed-consent
process, requiring physicians to offer them to patients with regard to treatment
choices for preference-sensitive care.301 This is care in which the clinical evi-
dence does not clearly support one treatment option over another, confronting
the patient and provider with significant tradeoffs among different outcomes for
each treatment.302 The goal is to give patients full information about treatment
tradeoffs and ensure that their preferences are incorporated into the treatment
295 Callahan, supra note 2, at 82.
296 Id. at 79, 82.
297 Maria J. Silveira, Scott Y.H. Kim & Kenneth M. Langa, Advance Directives and Out-
comes of Surrogate Decision Making Before Death, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1211, 1211
(2010).
298 Pauline W. Chen, Making Your Wishes Known at the End of Life, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/health/15chen.html.
299 Id.
300 For a useful history of the phrase and its sponsors, see Death Panel, WIKIPEDIA (Apr. 3,
2013, 12:14 AM), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_panel.
301 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36 (Supp. IV 2010).
302 John E. Wennberg & Philip G. Peters, Jr., Unwarranted Variations in the Quality of
Health Care: Can the Law Help Medicine Provide a Remedy/Remedies?, 37 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 925, 934 (2002).
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plan. Perhaps such aids could be developed to help patients converse about
treatment choices from hospice to extraordinary measures. As decision aids are
developed and adopted, it may well be that a range of treatments for terminal
illness will help patients to understand the costs and benefits of costly end-of-
life treatments and choose to forego them in some cases. Jill Lepore reminds us
that “[i]n Man versus Death, being clever helps, but the best you can hope for is
to prolong the game. Death always wins. Death is a bastard. Death cheats.”303
Advance directives help us regain control over death, and if we choose not to
“prolong the game,” we will be passing the savings on to our children.
CONCLUSION
Cost inflation in the United States is stressing the existing employment-
based health insurance system, and government program budgets. The average
American’s income is falling further and further behind rises in health coverage
costs.304 Reducing the growth of new spending on low value technologies is the
central cost control goal of the next decade.305
The ACA has created powerful new tools to limit the diffusion of new
technologies until we have evidence on effectiveness, outcomes, and innova-
tion. We should begin to narrow medical practice variation as we differentiate
between high-value care and low-value care. This requires robust technology
assessment tools that reduce political pressures that might jeopardize funding,
no easy process to achieve in American politics. The research must also look
beyond raw comparative effectiveness to the costs of care associated with that
technology. Private insurance may have potential to lead the way, uncon-
strained by Congressional discomfort with any version of cost effectiveness.
A second way to cramp cost is to continue payment reform in all of its
forms, including coordination tools such as the ACOs and medical homes pay-
for-performance aimed particularly at hospitals, and IPAB evaluation of physi-
cian payment in the Medicare system. The system has to move from a focus on
profitable services to a more robust focus on good outcomes for groups of
patients.
The American system is changing with or without the innovations of the
ACA. But the range of ACA innovations is already accelerating these changes.
Employers may exit the process of providing health care benefits altogether
with or without ACA insurance reforms. The irony of resistance to the ACA is
that government may be forced increasingly to be the primary provider of cov-
erage for much of the population through state exchanges that will be created,
Medicare, Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), the mil-
itary health system, Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program, the
Indian Health Service (IHS), Veterans’ Affairs (VA), and other programs.306
We may well be moving toward a federalization of health care, in which the
federal government accumulates real bargaining power vis-a`-vis providers.
303 LEPORE, supra note 282, at xviii.
304 GINSBURG, supra note 72, at 20.
305
 Id.
306 Paul Keckley, Health Reform Memo—June 18, 2012, CFO J. (June 21, 2012, 11:18
PM), http://deloitte.wsj.com/beta/2012/06/21/health-reform-memo-june-18-2012/.
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Other shifts that impact cost are occurring in the health care system.
Young doctors want more control over their lives and are rejecting the previous
physician generation’s desire for solo practice and control over income in a fee-
for-service system. Doctors have typically been high users of services and
heavy investors in labs and clinics to set their target incomes high. Fraud and
abuse laws have curtailed much of this investment, and this cohort is also leav-
ing the workforce in droves, replaced by younger physicians who want a pre-
dictable income without entrepreneurial anxiety. Hospital employment of
physicians has grown thirty-two percent since 2000.307
The problem with these demand shifts of young physicians is that primary
care practice lacks sufficient economic incentives to attract larger numbers of
physicians to practice. The ACA provides strong incentives to increase the
numbers of primary care physicians.308 Some of the ACA features include: a
ten percent bonus to primary care practitioners who see Medicare patients
(2011–2015); increase in payment rates to Medicare levels for two years for
primary care physicians who see Medicaid patients (2013–2014); training of
more than 16,000 new primary care providers over the next five years; a doub-
ling of the capacity of community health centers, “serving 15 million to 20
million more people by 2015, to help meet the demand of the newly
insured.”309
The other shift in employment is fostered by moves to integrate the prac-
tice of medicine. The focus by the ACA and the CMS on bundled payments
means that providers must operate in more efficient groups. Large group prac-
tices are growing. It takes a group to afford modern practice, which will require
protocols to reduce practice variation in care delivery, chronic disease manage-
ment, case management, and other modern (and expensive) tools. These larger
practices, whether owned by hospitals, insurers, or investors, will have more
capital and human resources required to successfully reduce care costs.
The reality of defining high-quality health care and how it relates to cost
will also continue to confound simplified models of cost control. A recent study
of care in Canadian hospitals concluded that quality may cost more, not less.310
Efficiencies may not reduce the costs of good outcomes. The authors found that
“[a]mong Ontario hospitals, higher spending intensity was associated with
lower mortality, readmissions, and cardiac event rates.”311 “[I]n Ontario, a
307 See AM. HOSP. ASS’N, AHA HOSPITAL STATISTICS (2012).
308 Melinda Abrams et al., Realizing Health Reform’s Potential: How the Affordable Care
Act Will Strengthen Primary Care and Benefit Patients, Providers, and Payers, 1 COMMON-
WEALTH FUND 1, 1 (2011).
309 Melinda Abrams, How Will the Affordable Care Act Bolster Primary Care?, COMMON-
WEALTH FUND BLOG (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Blog/2011/Jan/
Affordable-Care-Act-Bolsters-Primary-Care.aspx.
310 See Therese A. Stukel et al., Association of Hospital Spending Intensity with Mortality
and Readmission Rates in Ontario Hospitals, 307 JAMA 1037, 1037 (2012). “Our objective
was to assess whether acute care patients admitted to Canadian hospitals that treat patients
more intensively (and at higher cost) have lower mortality and readmissions and higher
quality of care.” Id. at 1038. “We found that higher hospital spending intensity was associ-
ated with better survival, lower readmission rates, and better quality of care for seriously ill,
hospitalized patients in Ontario in a universal health care system with more selective access
to medical technology.” Id. at 1042.
311 Id. at 1037.
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province with global hospital budgets and fewer specialized health care
resources than the United States, outcomes following an acute hospitalization
are positively associated with higher hospital spending intensity.”312
Higher spending on evidence-based services delivered in the acute phase of care for
severely ill hospitalized patients—by far the largest component of spending for our
cohorts—is indeed likely to be beneficial.
. . .
. . . Higher spending intensity, in turn, is associated with greater use of specialists,
better patient care, and more use of advanced procedures.313
These results suggest that it is critical to understand not simply how much
money is spent but whether it is spent on effective procedures and services. If
improved mortality and fewer adverse events are the result of high spending
intensity, those savings have to be factored into the cost-value equation.
Cost control may also require a lowering of patient expectations of care. Is
this likely to happen in the United States, where death is unwelcome and tech-
nology is loved beyond reason? Americans overrate the effectiveness of health
care and they need to get over it.
312 Id. at 1044.
313 Id. at 1043–44.
